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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the expansion of the concept of security to include environmental threats. 
Contrary to conventional opinion the expansion of security can take place not only in terms of 
global security, but also national security. In order to demonstrate this, the thesis studies the 
threat posed to Canada from environmental degradation in the Russian North. This study 
includes not only an analysis of the threats that exist to Canada, but also an examination of the 
Canadian governments' responses to these threats. The analysis demonstrates that in most cases 
the Canadian government has failed to properly identify and properly address these environmental 
threats and thus there is a need for a re-evaluation of the scope of national security. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The end of the Cold War has not only eased military tensions, it has also provided the opportunity 
to re-evaluate the issue of what exactly constitutes a security threat. This re-evaluation has led to 
an expansion of the concept of security to include non-military threats such as economic 
instability, food scarcity, and overpopulation. One of the most important non-military threats that 
is gaining increasing attention and acceptance from scholars is the threat posed from 
environmental degradation. However, redefining security to include environmental degradation 
continues to meet resistance by those who feel that security issues should deal strictly with 
military issues. This thesis investigates the question of environmental degradation as a security 
threat through an examination of the marine and air transport of pollution from Russia to Canada. 
The thesis challenges the conventional view of security and adds to the growing literature which 
argues that the concept of security should be expanded to include environmental threats. It also 
departs from the usual focus of environmental security as global security to argue that some 
environmental problems are threats to national security. Thus, the thesis makes two primary 
contributions to the current literature on security. First, it contributes to the scholarship that 
suggests environmental degradation can be a security threat. Second, it makes an original 
contribution in the use of national security, rather than strictly global security, as a focus for 
environmental threats. 
Understanding that all environmental problems are not necessarily threats to security, and that 
there are many environmental threats to national security is critical if policy makers are to address 
environmental threats effectively. While policy makers give threats like ozone depletion and 
global warming greater attention at the global level, they largely ignore more national threats such 
as the buildup of nuclear contaminants in Northern Russia. By properly identifying certain 
environmental threats at a national level, we can make sure that different levels of environmental 
security threats are properly addressed. 
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In the past the nation-state was the center of international relations. More recently, a number 
of scholars have challenged the validity of the nation-state approach to international politics in the 
face of the increasing interdependence of states and globalization forces. With the creation of 
nuclear weapons the concept of international security emerged and in some cases replaced the 
importance of national security. Many scholars suggested that all states were connected and there 
was a need for co-operation and international institutions to deal with international threats. More 
recently the focus has turned to global security; some even suggest that a world order or 
government will be the result of an increased interdependence between states. Peace movements 
developed this concept of global security which embodies a program of global co-operation and 
peace. Some scholars view threats as international or global in nature, and suggest that the 
international system is moving away from anarchy towards a world or global government. 
While an increased interdependence among states has occurred, states have always interacted 
with each other. Moreover, claims of global governance are largely exaggerated. Anthony 
Giddens notes: 
It might be thought that what we see emerging here is an increasing movement 
towards 'one world', in which the nation-state form is likely to become less and 
less significant in the face of global patterns of organisation .. . The sovereignty of 
the nation-state, I have suggested, does not precede the development of the 
European state system, or the transferral of the nation-state system to a global 
plane. State authorities did not hold large areas of sovereign power destined to 
become increasingly confined by the growing network of international connections 
and modes of interdependence. On the contrary, the development of the 
sovereignty of the modern state from its beginnings depends upon a reflexively 
monitored set of relations between states ... 'International relations' are not 
connections set up between pre-established states, which could maintain their 
sovereign power without them: they are the basis upon which the nation-state exists 
at all. The period of the burgeoning of international organisations, including the 
League ofNations and the UN, is not one of the growing transcendence of the 
nation-state. It is one in which the universal scope of the nation-state was established. 1 
1 Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State and Violence (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1987), 263-264. 
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There has always been an international system of relations among modern states; in fact, the 
nation-state was an outcome of international relations. It does not follow that increased 
interdependence inevitably leads to a global system or world government. Rather the 
international and nation-state perspectives have always existed together: they are two sides of the 
same com. 
While the idea of a global government has yet to really be taken seriously, the concept of a 
global threat has become fairly prominent in ecological security circles. In fact, most debates 
concerning environmental threats focus on global threats which can only be dealt with at a global 
level. The reason for this is, of course, the global nature of some threats, such as the depletion of 
the ozone and climate change (also known as global warming). The problem, however, is that 
there are some environmental threats which threaten only one or a few countries directly. These 
threats are better served by addressing them at national or regional level. This thesis argues that 
the possibility of a positive response to such problems is greater if they are addressed at a national 
level. Some might point out that most threats affect more than just one country and, thus, should 
be addressed by all affected states. States do not preclude this option by defining a particular 
threat as a national security threat; rather, the identification of specific national security threats 
may inform other countries of the threat and allow them to address the concern as well. After all, 
viewing military threats as issues of national security never restrained a state from addressing it 
with the help of other countries. At least when addressed at the national level some form of 
action could be taken, and it is hoped that this action would be in co-operation with the other 
affected countries. 
This thesis uses the threat faced by Canada from the ecological degradation in the Russian 
North as a case study in order to examine the utility of viewing environmental threats at a national 
level. Now that Russia has become a more open society, we have more knowledge than ever 
before about the extent of the ecological damage caused by the arms race and the attempt to win 
the Cold War. Ironically most Western citizens viewed the weaponry as the greatest threat during 
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this period, when, an even greater threat may have come from the effort to produce this 
weaponry. The fact is that no Canadian has ever died from a nuclear bomb detonated by the 
Soviets on Canadian soil; however, the waste and pollution created by the Soviet military 
industrial complex has effected and will continue to effect Northern Canadians, as Chapters Two 
and Three demonstrate. This thesis argues that the build-up of nuclear waste, aging nuclear 
submarines, past nuclear tests and aging nuclear power plants in the Russian Arctic pose a direct 
threat to the northern population of Canada as well as the whole of the Canadian population. 
METHODOLOGY 
To investigate the question of environmental degradation as a national security threat this thesis 
uses the case study method and the public policy approach. The empirical case for the study is 
the security threat that pollution in the Russian North poses to Canada. I chose this case study 
because of the extent and degree of environmental degradation that exists in the Russian North. 
More specifically, the nuclear contamination that has taken place in Russia is incomparable to 
other areas. It is also a more regional type of threat. Furthermore, one can make a strong case 
concerning the threat posed to Canada due to the extent of this contamination and the possibilities 
that exist for transport in the Arctic. For this reason, if the case cannot be made here that 
environmental degradation can pose a national security threat then, it probably cannot be made at 
all. 
The case study is a crucial-case study and more specifically a most-likely case study in terms 
of Harry Eckstein's seminal classification of case studies. 2 While the concept of the most-likely 
case is usually used to invalidate theories, this thesis uses a variation of this case study in order to 
help validate an expansion ofthe concept of security. The study uses the most-likely case to see if 
the case can help confirm an expansion of the security concept. Confirmation does not mean that 
2 Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political 
Science, vol. 7, edited by Fred Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 
1975), 113-123 . 
4 
the expansion is automatically validated by the case; rather if this case fits then further cases can 
be tested as well. However, if this case failed to confirm the expansion then there would be little 
utility in pursuing the expansion of the concept of security (in the terms presented in this thesis) 
further. By using a most-likely case study the failure to confirm a theory begins to invalidates it, 
because if the most-likely case does not work than less-likely cases will probably not work either. 
The case study investigates two propositions: (1) that environmental degradation can be a 
security threat; (2) that environmental degradation can be not only a global security threat but 
also a national security threat. The thesis uses the following criteria to make the distinction 
between global and national environmental threats as well as to assess whether or not a national 
security threat exists: 
1. In order to be a national security threat an environmental problem must drastically 
threaten the welfare of a nation. 
2. A national security threat has sources from one or few states. 
3. In order to be a national security threat the more extreme effects of the threat should 
only threaten a single country or several countries of a region. 
The first criterion establishes whether or not a security threat exists by determining whether the 
welfare of a state is threatened. The use of the term welfare in this case is defined in terms of the 
health of the population. If contamination leads to a substantial lowering of life expectancy or in 
increased mortality and morbidity rates than this would be an attack on the welfare of the state. 
The last two criteria distinguish national from global security threats. Global warming, for 
example, is not a national security threat on the basis that it has multiple sources and affects all 
states in the world. 
Although this is not a normative theory driven thesis, normative concerns clearly underlie this 
endeavour. The thesis considers environmental degradation and pollution as detrimental problems 
in the world which need to be addressed. Furthermore, the Canadian government needs to 
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address these threats at a specific level if it is to effectively address environmental security 
questions. 
OVERVIEW OF THE CHAPTERS 
The main objective of the first chapter is to make the case for the inclusion of environmental 
problems not only into the global security agenda, but also national security agendas. The first 
section of the chapter examines the concept of security, including the debate between traditional 
and non-traditional types of security. Then the chapter examines the different paradigms used in 
international relations and security studies. The case is then made for the inclusion of 
environmental issues into the security agenda. The last main section focuses on the debate 
between globalists and nationalists with respect to environmental security. This section makes the 
case for viewing environmental threats as national security threats as well as global threats. 
The second chapter examines the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic from marine pollution in 
Russia. It starts with an examination of the buildup of nuclear waste and then proceeds to a 
discussion of nuclear submarine accidents. In addition to these sources of nuclear contamination, 
the chapter also addresses the issue of persistent organic pollutants (POPs). The chapter suggests 
that the possible nuclear contamination poses a security threat to Canada. On the other hand, the 
chapter suggests that POPs are a global concern that states should address through global 
cooperation. 
Chapter Three examines the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic from atmospheric pollution 
emanating from Russia. The first section of the chapter discusses nuclear bomb tests and the 
threat they still pose. This is followed by an examination of the threat posed by aging nuclear 
power plants in Russia. In addition to the threat posed by these problems, the chapter examines 
the problem of arctic haze and acidification for the possible threat they may pose. 
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The responses made by the Canadian government towards the problems discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three are the focus of the fourth chapter. The first part of the chapter examines the new 
opportunity for cooperation with Russia that exists due to the end of the Cold War. Subsequently 
there is an examination of Canadian policy statements with respect to the identification of 
environmental threats to the Canadian Arctic. This is followed by an evaluation of the Canadian 
government's actual policies and actions with respect to the threats discussed in Chapters Two 
and Three. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
The extraordinary international changes resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union have led 
not only to the end of the Cold War, but also to the opportunity to reassess the concept of 
security. In the past the concept of security was applied to military threats to a state. This has 
changed substantially since the end of the Cold War; in fact, an increasing number of scholars and 
practitioners use the term security to encompass much more than just military security, and are 
extending its use to such areas as the environment, population growth and poverty. The 
expansion of the definition of security is gaining wider acceptance as concerns such as global 
warming receive greater attention from governments and the general public. However, the 
acceptance of the expansion of the notion of security is far from universal. As part of the debate 
the thesis examines the utility of broadening the concept of security to include environmental 
issues. This chapter begins by defining the concept of security in general, and then proceeds to 
examine the different paradigms that are used in relation to this concept. The chapter then deals 
specifically with arguments in favour of broadening the concept of security to include 
environmental threats. The final section considers the arguments for viewing environmental 
degradation as a national security threat. 
DEFINITION OF SECURITY 
One of the main limitations of the debate surrounding the concept of security is that a general 
agreeable definition of security has been difficult to find . Marc A. Levy, suggests that the 
literature has " ... failed to offer definitions [of security] at all, or has offered plainly self-serving 
and closed-minded ones ... ," and then he goes on to say that "ifthere is to be any serious 
consideration of environmental threats by the security studies and security policy communities, we 
need more thoughtful consideration of how to define the potential common ground. "3 Buzan 
3 Marc A. Levy, "Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" International Security 20, no.2 
(Falll995): 37. 
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takes these comments a bit further by suggesting that not only is it difficult to find a simple 
definition for security but that " ... the nature of security defies pursuit of an agreed general 
definition. "4 While Levy's and Buzan's observations are not fully misplaced, a number of scholars 
have attempted to produce an agreed upon definition of security. The problem in finding an 
agreed upon definition reflects the different ideological camps that exist within international 
politics. Many realists, for example, would offer a much more limited view of security than 
liberalists and idealists. While acknowledging the difficulty in arriving at an agreed upon general 
definition this chapter will examine recent definitions of security and then endeavour to offer a 
working definition of security. 
Types of Security 
There are two main views of security: traditional and non-traditional. Traditional security focuses 
on military security, while non-traditional security focuses on a broadened notion of security 
which includes non-military sources. The traditional view of security was more prominent during 
the Cold War; non-traditional security concerns have gained greater attention more recently. 
Traditional Security 
The traditional view of security was based on realism which focused on the nation-state and 
power struggles between states as the driving force in international relations. Realism sees the 
sovereign state as the primary unit of analysis and focuses almost exclusively on external military 
threats to the state. As Harriet Critchley and Terry Terriffnote the traditional goal of national 
security is "the protection of the territorial and political integrity of the state and its national 
interests. "5 Accordingly, the main focus of national security programs is to protect the nation 
4 Barry Buzan, People States & Fear (New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 16. Other 
authors who also suggest that this is problem are: James DerDerian, "The Value of Security: 
Hobbes, Marx, Nietzsche, and Baudrillard," in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. Lipschutz (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 28; Ronnie D . Lipschutz, "On Security," in On 
Security, edited by Ronnie D . Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 7. 
5 W. Harriet Critchley and Terry Terriff, "Environment and Security," in Security Studies for the 
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from external military threats. This concept of security gained greater prominence during the 
Cold War and according to Gareth Porter it was viewed as "a function of the successful pursuit of 
interstate power competition. n6 Within the pursuit of power " ... states threaten each other, 
challenge each other's sovereignty, try to impose their will on each other, defend their 
independence and so on. "7 Thus, scholars and policy makers saw military threats as the only real 
threats to security. 
The traditional view has received many challenges over the past two decades as scholars 
endeavour to redefine the notion of security, in order to address new types of threats. New 
challenges to the traditional concept of security are not limited, however, to redefining security. 
They also included the critique that within the view of traditional security sources that were not 
directly military were also addressed. For example Nathan Ruff, Robert Chamerlain and 
Alexandra Cousteau suggest that "consideration of the natural environment and security together 
is certainly not a new phenomenon. Natural resources and strategic minerals have long been 
considered vital to a nation's security, and well within the realm of military attention. "8 It is still 
evident that national security was focused on military threats, but that if an issue had an effect on 
military security, for example having access to uranium deposits, then that issue could also be 
considered as part of national security. 
1990s, Richard Shultz, et. al. eds. (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 327. 
6 Gareth Porter, "Environmental Security as a National Security Issue," Current History 94, no. 
592 (May 1995): 218 . 
7 Ole. Waever, "Securitization and Desecuritization," in On Security, edited by Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 50. 
8 Nathan Ruff, Robert Chamerlain and Alexandra Cousteau, "Reports on Applying Military and 
Security Assets to Environmental Problems," Environmental Change and Security Project Report 
no. 3 (Spring 1997): 82. See also : Eileen Claussen, "Environment and Security: The Challenge of 
Integration," Environmental Change and Security Project no. 1 (Spring 1995): 42. 
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On at least on one occasion public pressure forced the American government to look beyond 
military security to environmental security. 9 This occasion was the limited nuclear test ban treaty 
signed by the United States in 1963 . Franklyn Griffiths suggests that the treaty was actually the 
first major act of the United States which could be termed environmental security. He argues that 
the treaty was a response to public discontent with nuclear fallout and its possible health effects 
from nuclear testing. 10 Nevertheless, for the most part traditional security was solely concerned 
with military issues and it was seldom that other issues were viewed in the security context. For 
example, while Griffiths suggests that the limited nuclear test ban treaty was an act of 
environmental security, it is doubtful that in 1963 the term or even idea of environmental security 
was used as a tool for signing the treaty. One can only debate the traditional concept of security 
to a certain extent; the fact remains that the main focus of traditional security was the military 
sector. 
Non-traditional Security 
Whereas traditional security tended to focus on military threats to security, more recent non-
traditional security examines the utility of redefining the scope of security to specifically include 
other types of non-military threats that are not even related to the military sector. Recent 
attempts to redefine security are much more controversial and include several different 
perspectives. In particular the emphasis in some of these new definitions has moved away from 
the state to the individual. The more recent concept of security is based on the notion of "well-
being." For example the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security (CliPS) defines 
the security of a state as the ability "to be safe from threats to the well-being of one's state or 
country. "1 1 The idea of "well-being" has become a popular term among environmental security 
9 I use an American example here because for the most part security debates have been directed 
by the United States. 
1° Franklyn Griffiths, "Environment in the Security Debate: The Case of the Missing Arctic 
Waters," Environmental Change and Security Project Report no. 3 (Spring 1997): 16. 
11 Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, "Security: Canada and the Arctic," 
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scholars. One of the main proponents of the concept of well-being is Norman Myers. Myers 
believes that : 
... security applies most at the level of the citizen. It amounts to human well-
being: not only protection from harm and injury but access to water, food, 
shelter, health, employment, and other basic requisites that are the due of every 
person on Earth. It is the collectivity of these citizen needs - overall safety and 
quality oflife- that should figure prominently in the nation's view ofsecurity. 12 
For those who support the well-being concept, the issue of security is directed towards 
individuals in society rather than states. Myers is not the only supporter of this view of security. 
According to Pierre Pettigrew, one of the Co-Chairs of the National Forum on Canada's 
International Relations, the top priority of Canadian foreign policy is "human security. "13 The 
concept of human security includes problems such as population growth, human rights, and many 
argue environmental degradation. 
Because the view of human security includes many different problems and issues, this new 
approach to security is too broad in scope and now includes everything that could possibly pose a 
problem for any individual in society. The result is that this approach makes it difficult to 
distinguish between real threats to security and more general problems affecting men and women. 
Waever suggests that the problem with such a broad definition is: 
... deciding where to stop, since the concept of security otherwise becomes a 
synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable. How, then, can we 
get any clear sense of the specific character of security issues, as distinct from 
other problems that beset the human condition ... the individual has various needs 
and can be hurt by threats to these needs, and this makes everything a potential 
CliPS Factsheet no. 7 (March 1989): 1. Will be referred to as CliPS from here on. 
12 Norman Myers, "Environmental Security: How it Works," in Ultimate Security (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1993), 31. 
13 Canada. Report of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons 
Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy, Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and Priorities for the 
Future (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services, November 1994), 11. 
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security problem ... widening the term has the unfortunate effect of expanding the 
security realm endlessly, until it encompasses the whole social and political agenda.14 
For authors such as Waever it is the survival of the sovereign state that is the only real security 
issue. For them the protection of the state as a political unit has to be maintained in order for 
other issues, such as the environment and the economy, to be addressed at all .15 Thus, according 
to Waever and other authors who challenge the broadening of the scope of the concept of 
security, even if half of the population of a particular state were killed by an environmental 
catastrophe this problem would not have constituted a threat if it did not threaten the "sovereignty 
or independence of a state .... " 16 
Other authors, such as Kenneth Keller, also feel that the definition of security has become too 
broad, but suggest that there is room for a reformulation of the concept as opposed to an 
expansion of the term. According to Keller it would be more beneficial to simply identify 
" ... those environmental threats that may lead to traditional security problems and those that can be 
responded to most effectively by military organizations." 17 In either case, these two views have a 
rather narrow concept of security studies and still focus on military threats. The fact is that there 
are serious environmental threats which should be addressed for their own security implications, 
rather than just their effect on military security. 
A New Middle Ground 
While authors such as Waever and Keller seek to limit the definition of security too much, others 
like Myers expand the concept beyond any usefulness. In the case ofWaever and Keller their 
14 Waever, 47-48. 
15 Ibid., 53 . 
16 Ibid. 
17 Kenneth H. Keller, "Unpackaging the Environment," Environmental Change and Security 
Project Report no. 3 (Spring 1997): 5. 
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limitations on the definition of security mean that only military threats can be taken into 
consideration. Myers, on the other hand, expands the definition so much that almost any problem 
or issue could be termed a security threat. This thesis suggests a middle ground between the two 
positions that allows for new types of threats to be considered, while at the same time limiting the 
use of the term so that the term security remains meaningful. One author whose definition of 
security seems to achieve this goal is Jack Goldstone. He suggests that a national security issue is 
any trend or event that: 
(1) threatens the very survival ofthe nation; and/or 
(2) threatens to drastically reduce the welfare of the nation in a fashion 
that requires a centrall1 co-ordinated national mobilization of resources 
to mitigate or reverse. 8 
Goldstone's definition is broader because it includes the notion of the 'welfare' of the nation, yet at 
the same time limits the use of the security concept to accommodate dire threats. He notes that 
"while this seems common sense, it is clear from this definition that not any threat or diminution 
of welfare constitutes a national security threat; what does constitute such a threat is a matter of 
perception, judgment, and degree- and in a democracy, a legitimate subject for national 
debate." 19 In a democracy like Canada, for example, one would be able to argue that an issue (be 
it military, environmental, economic, etc.) should be seen as a national security threat. If all issues 
are "subject for national debate" then all issues have a fair chance ofbeing heard. Hopefully only 
issues whose case could be proven to be urgent and extreme would be considered security threats. 
At the same time, in contrast to Myers it is the welfare of the state and/or its population as a 
whole that is considered. This definition does not omit environmental and other non-traditional 
threats from the security realm. Rather, it allows for serious threats -- traditional or non-
traditional -- to be addressed as security issues. 
18 Thomas Homer-Dixon, Marc Levy, Gareth Porter, and Jack Goldstone, "Environmental 
Scarcity and Violent Conflict: A Debate," Environmental Change and Security Project Report 
no. 2 (Spring 1996): 66. 
19 Ibid. 
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THREE DIFFERENT SECURITY PARADIGMS 
One problem surrounding the concept of security is establishing an agreed upon general definition 
of security. A second problem stems from the different paradigms used to approach security. 
The second problem is related to the issue of defining security threats as national, international or 
global. The main supporters, of an expanded definition of security are globalists who feel that 
environmental problems are global security threats and thus can only be addressed adequately on 
a global level. This thesis contends that environmental threats can also be considered as national 
and/ or international security threats, and that some are actually dealt with more effectively at the 
national level. 20 However, before the debate over national security can unfold it is necessary to 
briefly explain the underlying assumptions of the three different paradigms. 
National Security 
The concept of national security has been the most prominent paradigm to emerge in the security 
realm and is the basis for the traditional security view. According to Helga Haftendom the 
concept of national security essentially emerged with the creation of nation-states in the 
seventeenth century. It was during this time that Haftendom suggests that the idea of national 
survival became pervasive.21 In this period the driving force behind national security was one of 
territorial and political survival. In the 1940s, according to Haftendorn, the concept of national 
security began to give way to the idea of international security as two new elements were added 
to the view of national security. These two elements were the a renunciation offeree and a 
20 Richard Shultz, et. al., "Introduction," in Security Studies for the 1990s, Richard Shultz, et. al. 
(Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 1. The concept of regional security is also present but is really a 
sub-category of international security. It is suggested by Helga Haftendom that each concept of 
security corresponds to different theoretical and political assumptions and is linked to the 
evolution of the international state system from the formation of nation-states to the modem state 
system. Helga Haftendom, "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in 
International Security," International Studies Quarterly vol.35, no.1 (March1991) : 5. 
21 Ibid 
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respect for human rights. 22 In other words there was a more peaceful outlook and a step away 
from military might, which helped foster the growth of international security as a paradigm. 
Under national security the primary concern is for the survival of a particular state. This is 
akin to the ideology of realism which views nations as the main political actors in the system. 
Realism stresses the importance of sovereignty, the inevitability of crises and the dominance of 
power in the pursuit of self-interest.23 Essential to the realist paradigm is that politics is about 
power, and only military strength can guarantee security. Barry Buzan suggests that from the 
realist perspective the way to attain security is for a state to acquire "enough power to reach a 
dominating position ... " in the world. 24 As can be seen from these comments realism is primarily 
focused on power politics between nation-states. Realists view national security in terms of 
survival and thus, the acquisition of military power is essential. Under realism the focus of 
national security is military security. 
While theories about interdependence and globalization abound, realists argue that the nation-
state is still the most powerful and prominent unit in the international setting. The fact that 
nation-states are still the primary avenue for dealing with security issues is demonstrated by the 
fact that most attempts at collective security arrangements have generally proven unsuccessful. 
22 Ibid , 7 
23 Ken Booth, New Thinking About Strategy and International Security (London: HarperCollins 
Academic, 1991), 16; Caroline Thomas, The Environment in International Relations (London: 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), 3; John Vogler, "Introduction: The 
Environment in International Relations: Legacies and Contentions," in The Environment and 
International Relations, edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 1-
10. 
24 Buzan, People States & Fear, 2; Matthew Paterson, "IR Theory: Neorealism, 
Neoinsitutionalism and the Climate Change Convention," in The Environment and International 
Relations, edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 62-63. 
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Haftendorn suggests that both the League ofNations and the United Nations (UN) failed because 
of the dominance of national security over collective security. 25 
However, in the examination of the next two paradigms it will become evident that there has 
been a shift towards the idea of greater international and global security. Some authors, such as 
Michael Renner, even suggest that national security is an outmoded concept that neglects the idea 
that security is increasingly attained through co-operation and non-violent dispute mechanisms. 26 
When Renner uses the terminology of co-operation and non-violent dispute mechanisms it would 
seem most likely that any co-operation would be between nation-states, thus reinforcing the 
dominance of national objectives. It is apparent that even within his view of security the idea of 
the predominance of nation-states seems to be inherent due to the terminology utilized. While 
realism and military security have been the focus of national security in the past, this does not 
mean that now when new types of threats are emerging this focus can not be broadened to include 
these new threats. The discussion of the following paradigms shows that to a large degree the 
idea of environmental security has already been accepted into the global and international 
paradigms. This thesis asserts, however, that some environmental issues are national security 
Issues. 
International Security 
The liberalist paradigm in international relations offers the main critique of realism and the 
concept of national security. The liberalist paradigm emphasizes the impact of international 
institutions (as opposed to nation-states) in the international arena, and is the foundation for the 
concept of international security.27 Within this paradigm there is a greater optimism concerning 
25 Haftendorn, 8. 
26 Michael, Renner, National Security: The Economic and Environmental Dimensions 
(Washington: World Watch Institute, May 1989), 64. 
27 Haftendorn, 13 . 
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the possibility for greater cooperation in the international arena. The view of collective or 
international security suggests that nation-states do not solely act in their own self-interest, but 
actually cooperate with other states for a "collective good." 
The concept of international security emerged from the possibility of a nuclear war. The 
possibility of nuclear devastation meant that even a strong program of national security might not 
be enough. 28 This possibility forced countries to look at security in a broader context and they 
began looking at their own security in terms of international security because it was apparent that 
international security directly affected national security. According to liberal theorists one can 
only fully understand individual national securities, when they are considered in relation to other 
states and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole. 29 Thus, an unstable 
international system could endanger a seemingly secure nation-state. For example the United 
States has taken a greater interest in international stability with the realization that growing 
international instability can have direct implications on American security. This reflects the main 
idea behind international security: the security of one state is interconnected with that of others.30 
Shultz suggests that the security of a state can be linked not only to other friendly states, but 
possibly even to adversarial states. 31 During the Cold War this was evident in the doctrine of 
mutually assured destruction: one country could be deterred from starting a confrontation in the 
interest of its own security because of the consequences of the threat of nuclear retaliation. Since 
this applied to both the US and Russia, both countries had shared security interests. 
28 Ibid. , 9. 
29 Booth, 34. 
30 Shultz, "Introduction," 2. 
31 Richard Shultz, "Introduction to International Security," in Security Studies for the 1990s, 
Richard Shultz, et. al. eds. (Washington: Brassey's, 1993), 46. 
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Interestingly national security agendas can include the idea of collective security. The 
Canadian Department ofNational Defence stated in its 1994 Defence White Paper, for instance, 
that "Canadians have deemed their own security indivisible from that of their allies. "32 States may 
choose to cooperate in order to reach national security objectives more effectively, but 
cooperation does not take away from the fact that more often than not states act in their own self-
interest and usually only cooperate when it is in their interest to do so. In other words 
international or collective security is really only relevant, when national security agendas have 
deemed it to be so. Accordingly for environmental problems to be addressed globally, 
internationally, or nationally, national governments would have to decide that it is in their 
countries' security interests to do so. 
Global Security 
The concept of global security is a further extension of international security and the idealist 
paradigm. The main difference between global and international security is that global is inclusive 
of all states or people within the world, while international can technically only include the 
security of two or more states. The main foundation of global security originates from the 
writings ofKant, which focused on morality, universalism and international organization.33 
Global security is really a utopian vision which seeks to move beyond the nation-state to a world 
order in which each individual enjoys justice and happiness. 34 While the achievement of global 
security is at present doubtful, what emerges from the concept is the view that co-operation and 
peaceful change are possible. 
32 Canada. Department ofNational Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada, 1994), 12. 
33 Shultz, "Introduction to International Security," 7; Haftendorn, 11 . 
34 Haftendorn, 11 . 
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The thrust of the globalist argument is that there are greater and more significant threats to 
peace and stability than traditional national threats. Michael T. Klare argues that many of the 
"most severe and persistent threats to global peace and stability are arising not from conflicts 
between major political entities but from increased discord within states, societies and civilizations 
along ethnic, racial, religious, linguistic, caste, or class lines. "35 These discords, he argues, are a 
result of economic, demographic, sociological and environmental stresses which exacerbate 
existing divisions within societies. 36 In other words these new threats to security do not simply 
affect one state, but all individuals in the world. Not surprisingly globalists suggest that solutions 
to these problems are found within international organizations. Thus, globalists seek to move 
beyond the nation-state focus and concentrates on a "global commons" or "global good." 
Critics argue that the two main problems with the globalist approach are that it presupposes 
strong institutions that have enforcement powers and it requires radical systems change. 37 While 
in part these criticisms are valid, they discount the progress that can be made by simply 
acknowledging that global issues exist and need to be addressed. While it is more difficult to 
address global security problems this does not mean that they should not be addressed at all. 
Even without enforcement powers gains can be made on global environmental issues through 
voluntary cooperation among states. 
This study does not argue that global environmental threats do not exist or that they should 
not be addressed, rather, that global threats should be addressed separately from national or 
regional threats. While global threats should be acknowledged and addressed, national threats 
and the importance of the state in addressing global issues should not be neglected either. The 
35 Michael T. Klare, "Redefining Security: The New Global Schisms," Current History 95, no. 
604 (November 1996): 354. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Haftendorn, 12. 
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neglect of the role of nation-states and the failure to identify national threats is a limitation of the 
globalist paradigm. 
Differentiating Between the Paradigms 
The three different paradigms can be useful tools in discussing security; however, there are also 
some problems that arise with their use. One issue involves clearly differentiating between the 
three different paradigms. International security, for example, can be seen as being overlapping 
with either national or global security. While a country may designate a specific threat as a 
national security threat, more often than not the method used to address the threat is through 
international co-operation. Most threats, even traditional military threats, affect more than one 
country and need to be addressed by more than one country. The main point of difference 
between the two is that for realists states only chose to cooperate out of self-interest, while 
according to liberals the basis for cooperation is motivated by idealism. By contrast, both the 
globalist and internationalist positions have the same theoretical foundations and to some extent 
both look at moving beyond the nation-state. There is an overlap between these paradigms and it 
is difficult to draw a clear line between them. This thesis takes the view that while there may be a 
fuzzy distinction between national/international or international/global, there is a clear separation 
between the nationalist and globalist paradigms. Furthermore, it is not sufficient for a country to 
simply take into account global or national security, it must have an integrated view of security 
including, national and global issues. 
ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
Up to now the chapter has examined the different types of security (traditional and non-
traditional) and the different paradigms used in security studies. The discussion in the previous 
sections sets up the background of the security debate in terms of what issues have been and 
should be included in the security agenda and which different paradigms governments may adopt 
to address security threats. The following specifically answers the question: Why should 
environmental concerns be included in the security agenda? In answering the preceding question 
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Marvin Soroos identifies four types of arguments to consider when examining the linkage 
between the environment and security: conceptual, theoretical, political and normative. 38 
Through an examination of each of these arguments the chapter suggests a case can be made for 
viewing environmental problems as security threats. 
Conceptual or Human Security Argument 
The basis behind the conceptual argument is that the extent and seriousness of environmental 
problems have forced a rethinking ofthe concept ofsecurity.39 The conceptual argument arises 
by viewing security as implying freedom or protection from serious threats to human well-being. 
Within this argument whatever poses a threat, including environmental problems, to human well-
being becomes a security problem. Fauzya Moore contends that problems such as 11 environmental 
degradation, the reduction ofbiodiversity, global climate change and pollution; .... 11 will affect the 
well-being of every human if they are not addressed. 40 Michael Renner also supports this idea 
and notes that environmental degradation is not only a security threat but that in fact it is the 
11 most fundamental aspect of security11 because it undermines the support systems on which all 
human activity depends.1141 The idea of human well-being has become one ofthe main arguments 
used to add environmental issues to the security agenda. For example a 1996 report presented to 
the Canadian ministers ofForeign Affairs, National Defence and International Trade states that 
what should be pursued is 
... sustainable human development as an overarching policy framework for Canada. 
38 Marvin S. Soroos, 11 Global change, Environmental Security, and the Prisoner's Dilemma,11 
Journal of Peace Research 31, no. 3 (August 1994): 318. The conceptual, theoretical and 
normative arguments are also presented by Ruff, Chamerlain and Cousteau. See: Ruff, et. al., 83 . 
39 Soroos, 318; Ruff, et. al. , 83 . 
4° Fauzya Moore, Beyond Development Cooperation, Report on a conference organized by the 
Society for International Development, 15-16 October, 1993, Ottawa, Canada (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 1994), 6. 
41 Renner 29 ' . 
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Sustainable human development. .. ensures the effective stewardship of the global 
commons through sustainable and equitable global resource management and 
policies of ecological protection that respect the earth's carrying capacity.42 
The idea of "sustainable human development" has become a popular term in Canadian foreign 
policy and is meant to address environmental issues as well as other so called global problems. 
The problem with the term "sustainable human development" is that it is unmanageably 
inclusive of every possible threat and thus is not included specifically in the security agenda; 
rather, it is used to define overall what Canadian foreign policy should encompass. It is possible 
that this approach may be the best way in which to address global environmental problems such as 
climate change and ozone depletion. However, in terms of national security this idea ofwell-
being should be qualified with Goldstone's more restrictive definition of security. Thus, specific 
and serious environmental problems which pose threats to the well-being of a single country or a 
specific region can be addressed more effectively. 
Theoretical Security Argument 
A second type of argument that can be used to justify the concept of environmental security 
threats is a theoretical argument which is more traditional in its outlook. The theoretical 
argument focuses on empirical cause-and-effect relationships. More specifically this type of 
argument assesses the potential for environmental problems to generate conflict between states.43 
For example, a nation whose environment is degraded by an outside force may become hostile 
towards that force and the result is interstate conflict. Critchley and Terriff suggest that the 
potential for conflict fits in well with the more traditional concept of security. 44 One of the main 
42 Canada. Report of the Second Annual National Forum to The Honourable Andre Ouellet, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs; The Honourable David Collenette, Minister ofNational Defence; The 
Honourable Roy McLaren, Minister of International Trade, International Institutions in the 
Twenty-First Century: Can Canada Help to M eet the Challenge? (Toronto : Micromedia Limited, 
Microfiche Number 96-03146), 8-9. 
43 Soroos, 318. 
44 Critchley and Terriff, 332. 
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proponents of the theoretical argument is Thomas Homer-Dixon, who is well known for his 
research in the area of resource scarcity and its relation to conflict.45 The link, however, is often 
tenuous and it is only when issues of resource scarcity combine with other problems that conflict 
is likely to occur. Geoffrey and David Dabelko suggest that there appears to be little factual 
evidence that supports Dixon's claims of the relationship between conflict and resource scarcity.46 
Thus, present and past conflicts have not provided evidence to support the theoretical claim that 
resource scarcity or environmental degradation alone can cause conflicts. With this said, it is 
important to note that environmental problems can exacerbate existing tensions and problems 
between states. Either way the theoretical argument does not expand the concept of security 
beyond military issues, since the main focus is still the traditional security threat of conflict. This 
argument does not take into account that environmental threats can be security threats 
themselves; rather, it asserts that they are the cause of other military threats. Instead of viewing 
environmental problems as sources of conflict they should be addressed for the threat they cause 
in and of themselves. Dabelko and Dabelko state that "All issues of environmental degradation 
should not be forced to fit into the matrix of security and conflict. The conception of security 
must instead be changed to reflect the new threats of environmental degradation. "47 
Normative or Ecological Security Argument 
The normative argument has as its main focus the primacy of environmental values. This 
argument sees modern civilization as posing a threat to these values. 48 Within the normative 
45 Thomas Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcity, Mass Violence, and the Limits to Ingenuity," 
Current History 95, no. 604 (November 1996). 
46 Geoffrey D . Dabelko and David D. Dabelko, "Environmental Security: Issues of Conflict and 
Redefinition," Environmental Change and Security Project Report no. 1 (Spring 1995): 5. 
47 Ibid. , 8. 
48 Soroos, 319. 
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argument is the idea that the failure to properly consider environmental dimensions undermines 
the realization of human security. The argument would seem to suggest that environmental issues 
themselves deserve to be on the security agenda because they should have primacy over other 
issues. This reasoning lacks a justified assessment of which specific issues constitute a security 
threat. There also appears to be a minimization of the importance of military threats under the 
normative argument and this minimization lacks justification. It is important to include 
environmental threats in the security agenda, but military threats are just as important as in the 
past if not more so. The goal ofthis study is to broaden the scope ofthe security agenda, not to 
replace some threats with others. 
Political Argument 
The political argument advances the idea that by using the term security one gives the problem a 
"greater sense of urgency that elevates it to the realm of 'high' politics; and a place nearer the top 
of national and internal agendas along with military priorities. "49 By viewing environmental 
problems as security threats, one may be able to create a greater interest and sense of urgency for 
these issues. Richard Shultz and Marc A Levy suggest that the positioning of environmental 
issues as security issues is usually a veiled effort to receive greater prominence and financial 
support for the issue. 50 Even Homer-Dixon supports this suggestion and notes that some works 
attempting to use the concept of security to give greater prominence to environmental threats 
have an "underlying dishonesty and sloppiness. "5 1 From the sources assessed for this work the 
above statement appears invalid since most of the authors in favour of linking the environment 
and security did not attempt to hide their agenda and were clearly advocating the inclusion of 
environmental threats into the concept of security in order to both raise awareness concerning 
49 Soroos, 319. 
50 Shultz, et. al. , "Introduction," 1; Levy, 45 . 
51 Homer-Dixon, et. al. , 49. 
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particular issues and to raise more funds in order to address new threats. Porter suggests that the 
attempt to broaden the scope of security to give environmental issues greater respect, has been 
anything but hidden or veiled. Furthermore, he suggests that " ... proponents of environmental 
security have openly called for changes in policy, institutional mechanisms or budgetary 
allocations to reflect the new importance they argue should be accorded to global environmental 
threats. "52 National security has always been a tool and a symbol of high politics and by 
recognizing an issue as a national security threat it is given a greater importance which 
" ... overrides political and financial obstacles. "53 Porter argues that to suggest that proponents of 
environmental security should not try to " .. .influence that nation's policy and budget priorities by 
broadening the definition of national security is to suggest that they would have to operate under 
a set of rules that is different from that used by specialists for traditional security threats. "54 One 
simply has to examine the amount of money spent by the United States and Russia on security to 
realize that security issues are given a greater priority then other concerns. If environmental 
threats can prove to be as threatening, or more so than military threats there is no reason to 
exclude them from the security agenda simply because they are not the traditional type of threat. 
Serious environmental security threats deserve as much attention as other security threats and 
should be raised to the level of so called high politics. 
Arguments Against the Concept of Environmental Security 
Scholars have made several arguments against linking the concepts of security and the 
environment. Daniel Deudney has outlined many of these arguments in his article "The Case 
Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security." His first argument suggests 
that it is misleading to think of environmental degradation as a national security threat because the 
52 Ibid. , 63 . 
53 Ibid. , 62-63 . 
54 Ibid. , 62-63 . 
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traditional focus of national security (military threats) has little in common with either 
environmental problems or their solutions. 55 The dissimilarity with traditional threats supposedly 
precludes environmental threats from being considered as a part of national security. Stairs adds 
to the preceding argument by suggesting that although we may all be threatened by environmental 
issues, our chances of survival are unlikely to be improved by "lumping our alliance policies into 
the same pot as our approach to the international regulation of the use of pressure cans or 
refrigerator gases. "56 There is some validity to this claim; however, simply because 
environmental threats have some dissimilarities with the traditional concept of security does not 
mean that they are not valid or important. Under a new expanded security "umbrella" policy 
makers can identify and address different types of threats, and it should not seem strange or 
unmanageable that these threats are not all the same. The changing world and the identification 
of new types of threats have caused a change in the way we think about security: security is no 
longer simply equal to military security. Although a discussion of the dissimilarities between 
environmental and military threats will ensue it is necessary to point out that along with the 
dissimilarities there are also important similarities which link traditional security and 
environmental security. For example if an environmental problem is as destructive as a conflict 
this would suggest that they do indeed have a great deal in common. 
Dissimilarities Between Military and Environmental Threats 
One ofDeudney's main points under this discussion is that war and the environment have little in 
common. Although Deudney acknowledges the fact that war does have some environmentally 
damaging effects he suggests that most of the world's environmental degradation is not caused by 
55 Daniel Deudney, "The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National 
Security," Millennium: Journal of International Studies 19, no. 3 (1990): 461-476. 
56 Denis Stairs, "Contemporary Security Issues," Canada's Foreign Policy: Principles and 
Priorities for the Future Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons 
Reviewing Canadian foreign Policy, (Ottawa: Public Works and Services, 1994), 5. 
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war or the preparation for war. 57 This view neglects the fact that specific degradation caused by 
the preparation for war can cause specific security threats to specific countries. Deudney 
however delves into further detail as to how dissimilar security-from-violence and security-from-
environmental threats are by identifying three main dissimilarities. 
The first major dissimilarity is that while both threats may kill people they are not 
necessarily similar due to the fact that not all threats to life and property are threats to security. 58 
Deudney goes on to list other problems in society that cause death such as disease, old age, crime, 
and accidents which are not considered security threats. He then suggests that if everything that 
causes a decline in human well-being is labeled a security threat, the term loses any meaning or 
analytical usefulness and becomes a "loose synonym of 'bad."'59 Stairs also suggests that a flood 
of other issues will also want to be included under the security umbrella and they will all be 
neglected because none of them will be addressed properly. 60 This work has already suggested 
that security should not be a 'loose synonym of 'bad," and tried to address this problem through 
the use of a more limiting definition. Obviously if the term security simply meant anything 
harmful to a person this would make it impossible to efficiently identify and address security 
threats. Porter takes this response a step further by suggesting that " ... proponents of 
environmental security would argue that the traditional definition of national security distorted 
perceptions of global realities as well as policy priorities."61 Thus Porter believes that the agenda 
should be broadened significantly and he disputes whether or not traditional concepts of security 
ever were valid. Rather than totally dispute the traditional concept of security it is probably better 
57 Deudney, 463 . 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Stairs, 5. 
61 Porter, 218 . 
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to adjust it to suit new emerging problems. Goldstone's definition of security, for instance, does 
just that. 62 
The second difference stems from the degrees of intention involved in the threat. Violent 
threats usually involve a high degree of intentional behaviour whereas environmental degradation 
is largely unintentional. 63 Waever also makes this point and suggests that security has been: 
... conventionally, about the efforts of one will to (allegedly) override the 
sovereignty of another, forcing or tempting the latter not to assert its will in 
defence of its sovereignty. The contest of concern, in other words, is among 
strategic actors imbued with intentionality, and this has been the logic around 
which the whole issue of security has been framed. 64 
There is really no way to dispute this assertion except when dealing with environmental 
degradation caused intentionally by war. However, whether or not a threat is intended has little 
bearing on the potential consequences of that threat and, therefore, the threat needs to be 
addressed in either case. 
The last dissimilarity is that the organizations that provide protection from violence differ 
greatly from those in environmental protection. 65 According to this view, there is an inability for 
the security organizations to deal effectively with environmental problems. In addition, some 
scholars fear that by associating traditional security with environmental security the result will be 
a militarization of environmental issues. 66 This perspective does not take account of the role that 
62 This definition can be found on page 12 of this thesis. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Waever, 63 . 
65 Deudney, 464; Keller, 13; Waever, 64; Hugh C. Dyer, "Environmental Security as a Universal 
Value: Implications for International Theory," in The Environment and International Relations, 
edited by John Vogler and Mark F. Imber (London: Routledge, 1996), 23 . 
66 Dyer, 23 . 
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defence organizations can play in addressing environmental threats because of their leading edge 
technology and emergency response capability. Ruff, Chamerlain and Cousteau suggest that the 
intelligence community and military establishment can play a major role in environmental 
security.67 More specifically the technological equipment, such as remote sensing, satellite 
systems and underwater listening devices, possessed by these organizations could be very useful 
in determining "ecological disaster areas, tracking of global geological processes, monitoring 
pollution impact, [and] assisting in emergency clean-up situations .... "68 The United States' 
Department ofDefense demonstrated the usefulness of traditional security organizations when it 
sent military teams to Estonia and Lithuania to help clean up nuclear equipment and gas and oil 
spills at former Russian military bases. 69 When the Soviet troops left they badly damaged these 
bases and the Baltic governments did not have the knowledge or trained staff to address the 
environmental degradation caused by military activities at the bases. Obviously present defence 
and security organizations cannot address all environmental security concerns, but their 
technology and expertise would be of great benefit in addressing environmental security. 
However, before military organizations could adapt to new threats, non-traditional security 
threats need to gain wider acceptance. 
Another argument that is made against environmental security stems from the theoretical 
argument, discussed earlier in the chapter, in support of environmental security. The discussion 
of the theoretical argument suggested that environmental degradation or resource scarcity, in and 
67 Ruff, et. al., 86. 
68 Ibid. , 87. This article also suggested that remote sensing activities could be used in Russia to 
accomplish some ofthe following : tracking of impending ecological disasters, determination of 
ecological disaster areas and land degradation, reaction to emergency situations, tracking of 
global geological processes such as earthquakes, monitoring of forest diseases and pollution 
impact on tree cover, monitoring surface and underground water pollution and the tracking of ice 
floe movements. 
69 Kent Butts, "National Security, the Environment and DOD," Environmental Change and 
Security Project Report no. 2 (Spring 1996): 26. 
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of themselves, are not very likely to cause interstate wars. 70 Most scholars agree that at the 
present time environmental issues aggravate stressful situations, but do not directly cause 
conflicts. Brian Shaw adds that there is still cause to assess environmental factors as variables 
that lead to conflict even if they are not the only variable at play.71 It seems only logical to assess 
the role of environmental factors in a conflict just as other factors are assessed. For the purposes 
of this thesis the role of environmental problems in conflicts is a side issue and the main concern is 
whether or not environmental threats in and of themselves are security threats. 
Denis Stairs proposes one last argument against the concept of environmental security: by 
placing more items under the "security umbrella" there is a disservice done to all items.72 By 
placing an environmental problem in the security agenda it has to fight against other security 
issues for funds and attention as opposed to being on its own. Stair's reasoning may be mistaken 
because often simply identifying an issue as a security threat gives it greater prominence on the 
national agenda. Past experience has shown that governments give greater attention and funding 
to matters of national security. 
CAN ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS BE INCLUDED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
AGENDA? 
While global and international approaches to security have embraced the concept of 
environmental security, the third approach, national security, has not been widely recognized as a 
useful approach to environmental challenges. Some authors contend that the issue of 
environmental security should not be included as a part of national security because global 
70 Deudney, 461 . 
71 Brian R. Shaw, "When Are Environmental Issues Security Issues?" Environmental Change 
and Security Project Report no. 2 (Spring 1996): 40. 
72 Stairs, 5. 
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security would be undermined. 73 While there is a need to look at global environmental threats to 
security, this thesis asserts that there is also a place for environmental security within the concept 
of national security. The examination of environmental threats at a national level does not 
necessarily undermine global environmental security. It is plausible that through examining a 
specific environmental threat a state may suggest that the best forum through which to address 
the threat is global. Less well known threats may even be given a greater opportunity to be 
addressed at the global level through the above type of examination. In order to set up the debate 
between the globalist and nationalist perspectives on environmental security the next section will 
first examine some of the common arguments against using the national security approach to 
address environmental issues. 
Arguments Against Using the Nation as a Security Focus 
Not only has the environment not been included in the paradigm of national security, but in fact 
some scholars argue that it is not possible to reconcile environmental threats with national 
security objectives. One of the main arguments against the concept of national environmental 
security is that in attempting to promote environmental threats as national security threats 
globalist political objectives are undermined.74 There is no doubt that there are global 
environmental problems that need global solutions; however, there is also a need to address 
national environmental security threats which can not be addressed adequately at the global level. 
EricK. Stern suggests that it seems likely that for the next 50 years at least there will be a mixed 
system between national sovereignty and the international/global community. 75 This would 
suggest then that at the present time, in a world dominated by nation-states, there is a need for 
both levels of threats. As Kent Butts argues " ... while global security mechanisms are a desirable 
73 Deudney, 461 . 
74 Deudney, 461 . 
75 Eric K. Stern, "Bringing the Environment In: The Case for Comprehensive Security," 
Cooperation and Conflict 30, no. 3 (1995): 224. 
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outcome, pursuing them to the exclusion of short-term state-centric options for addressing 
environmental problems is short-sighted. "76 The realities of the present situation demand that 
threats be addressed not only at international levels but also at a national level. Having either a 
global or a national environmental agenda is not presently sufficient: both are necessary. 
A second argument against the use of national environmental security is that adopting a 
nationalist approach to deal with environmental security threats is dangerous because it will help 
reinforce militarism and foster prejudice. 77 Furthermore, a nationalist approach is incompatible 
with the environmental sphere because it may undermine the co-operation needed to deal with 
environmental issues. Deudney goes as far as to say that a focus on nationalism could lead to 
various types of interventions and a new imperialism. His argument, however neglects that 
environmental problems have a history of cooperation that will not be abandoned simply because 
governments identify them as national security threats. In fact Porter suggests that the concept of 
environmental security actually produces responses that are co-operative and not conflictual. 78 
The numerous agreements and treaties on the environment would seem to testify to that. If states 
were to come into conflict over environmental issues the problem would more than likely become 
worse and conflict would seem to be a self-defeating way to solve any environmental problem. 
John Vogler presents a third argument against using the national security agenda to address 
environmental threats. Vogler proposes that by trying to redefine national security to include 
environmental threats there is a risk that environmental problems will be " ... considered as an item 
somewhere near the bottom of a list of militarized national security priorities. "79 The argument 
76 Butts 22 ' . 
77 Deudney, 467; Soroos, 320. 
78 Porter, 222. 
79 Vogler, 10. 
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does not seem convincing in the present time, when the main military threat of the Soviet Union 
has disappeared, and security organizations are actually looking for a new way in which to direct 
their activities. If policy makers recognize environmental threats as security threats due to their 
possible impact on a nation's population, then there is no reason to put them at the "bottom of a 
list." Most environmental threats are presently not taken seriously enough; labeling them as 
national security threats automatically elevates them to a higher priority. The political argument 
addressed earlier in this chapter suggested that by placing environmental threats on the security 
agenda we do not do them a disservice but actually give them the greater attention that they 
deserve. 
Globalist Perspective 
The main focus of environmental security to date has been global environmental problems, such as 
ozone depletion and climate change. Furthermore, proponents of the globalist perspective usually 
view national security approaches as impediments to global security, because they reinforce the 
prominence of the nation-state. Globalists argue that no single nation can protect itself from or 
address by itself the challenges of global environmental problems. 80 What is needed instead is 
"collective action on a global scale. "81 This idea enforces the view that the traditional nation-
state perspective is incompatible with the demands of global security. According to Myers, it is 
not only necessary to expand the concept of security, but also to " ... adapt our policy responses by 
placing greater emphasis on collective security. "82 As can be seen by these statements the 
globalist perspective is not solely concerned with acknowledging global environmental threats, 
but more importantly with changing the present world system to a global order. 
80 Myers, 24; Thomas, 123 . 
81 Thomas, 5. 
82 Myers, 24. 
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The single largest problem with this perspective is that the nation-state is still the dominant 
force in the world. Arguments suggesting that the new interdependence of states is making way 
for a global government of some sort are misleading, since states have always interacted with each 
other. 83 Anthony Giddens argues that international relations are not the undoing of nation-states, 
but actually the " ... basis on which the nation-state exists at all. "84 Given this reality it is necessary 
to find a way in which to work within the present system of nation-states. The result is not that 
global threats will be neglected. Rather, since global threats affect all states, many states find it in 
their national interests to address global threats through international conferences and agreements. 
However, it is true that global environmental threats cannot be effectively dealt with through 
individual action and need to be addressed by a large international response. It would be better to 
set apart global environmental threats from national or regional threats stemming from the 
environment in order to address each level of threat more effectively. 
Another issue that arises from an analysis of the concept of global security is that the literature 
does not discuss the source of a given threat in determining the level of analysis. Rather, the 
focus up to now has been on the receiving state or states. With the new reexamination of security 
there can also be a new consideration for the source of threats. This study suggests that the 
source of a particular threat is also of importance when determining how to address specific 
threats. Global threats are labeled "global" because they affect the entire globe. But is it not also 
important that the source of many global threats is global? The fact that global threats very often 
have global sources makes them vastly different from national security threats which are derived 
from either one source or at the most a regionalized source that affects a regionalized group of 
83 As was noted earlier the problems faced by the UN serves as an example of the remaining 
prominence of nation-states. While at the present time there is a great deal of interaction among 
states, it is not totally inconceivable that this trend could be reversed due to animosities between 
rising and declining powers in the state system. For example if the United States began to decline 
rapidly as a world power the result could be a retreat from the international arena into a more 
isolationist policy. 
84 Giddens, 263-264. 
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states. This is a new consideration that scholars and policy makers should take into account when 
determining whether a threat is more global or national in nature. 
Nationalist Perspective 
While many arguments concerning environmental security suggest that it is now outmoded to use 
the nation-state level of analysis, there is still room for a greater development of the concept of 
national security itself It is not unrealistic to suggest that national security can also include 
environmental threats. Although some environmental problems, such as the depletion of the 
ozone layer and climate change, are global threats and need to be addressed at the global level, 
there are other threats that affect only specific countries. If one can demonstrate that an 
environmental problem drastically threatens the well-being of a nation there is no reason not to 
identify it as a national security threat. Goldstone suggests: 
The only thing that matters in the real world is whether environmental trends do 
pose threats either to our survival or welfare that require large scale national 
efforts to avoid, mitigate or reverse. If they do, they are ipso facto national 
security concerns. If not, then not. ... That is, it is foolish to ask whether we do 
or do not face environmental security problems. The sensible and immensely 
valuable question is to ask which of these possible threats we currently face, 
how severe each currently is, and how severe are they likely to become. 85 
If policy makers determine that an environmental security threat exists this does not mean that 
military measures are taken. Rather, these new non-military threats need new responses. 
Furthermore if policy makers address national environmental security threats, global threats are 
not automatically neglected. Rather, policy makers need to differentiate between global and 
national environmental security threats. If policy makers were to lump the two levels together 
either one ofthe two would be neglected. For example, if policy makers include global threats in 
the national security agenda, these threats would more than likely take a secondary seat to 
environmental issues that were closer to home. On the other hand, if policy makers lump more 
regionalized national security threats in with global threats the result would be the neglect of these 
85 Homer-Dixon, et. al. , 66-67. 
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more local security threats. If, instead, policy makers separate the two levels they can hopefully 
address both more effectively. Both levels ofthreats are pertinent to national security, since 
global threats threaten all nations, but they need to be addressed through different strategies. 
Policy makers can effectively address national environmental security threats through the national 
security agenda, whereas global environmental security threats are better dealt with through 
established international organizations such as the United Nations. 
This thesis focuses specifically on Canadian national environmental security threats originating 
from Northern Russia, and shows how they fit into the national security agenda. The thesis also 
briefly examines some global environmental threats to demonstrate, first of all, the differences in 
the two levels of threats-- national and global-- and secondly, that states therefore need different 
forums to address these threats appropriately. 
CONCLUSION 
Although environmental security is usually discussed in the context of international or global 
security, a strong case can be made that it is also relevant to national security. Obviously it is 
necessary for a state to cooperate with other states when dealing with environmental threats. This 
does not mean that a country cannot develop a national policy directed towards a particular 
security threat. It would seem appropriate that any national policy towards an environmental 
threat would include co-operation with other countries. Moreover, this is not all that different 
from how policy makers have addressed military threats in that when national security is 
threatened, many times the response has been to cooperate with other countries in trying to 
address the source of insecurity. Examples of security cooperation are found in both world wars 
as well as with NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In both situations alliances can prove to be useful 
instruments, but they do not have to be the only instruments. In this context, the next two 
chapters examine the potential security threat of environmental degradation in the Russian North 
to Canada. The fourth chapter examines Canadian responses to these threats. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Although the Cold War is over, its legacy of ecological degradation from militarization and 
industrialization lives on in Russia.86 It is only since the end of the Cold War that the severity of 
the degradation has become widely known and, correspondingly, the threat posed from it became 
evident. It is apparent that the degradation poses problems and threats to the population of the 
Russian Federation; however, this thesis demonstrates that environmental degradation in Russia 
also poses a threat to Canada and more specifically the Canadian Arctic. The focus of this 
chapter is the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic via marine transport of pollutants from 
Northern Russia. The two main types of marine transported pollutants examined are nuclear 
contaminants and POPs. The discussion demonstrates that while nuclear marine contaminants 
pose a national security threat to Canada, POPs are more of a global threat. While the nuclear 
threat is not military in nature it has the potential to harm the welfare ofNorthern Canadians, 
which is something that past Soviet military actions did not actually do. It is ironic that while 
most people feared the use of nuclear weapons during the Cold War, it is actually the radioactive 
waste associated with the production and testing of these weapons that poses a threat now. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section examines the extent of the 
nuclear waste buildup in Russia. Within the section the case is made for viewing this problem as a 
national security threat to Canada. The second section examines the national security threat 
posed to Canada from accidents involving Russian nuclear-powered submarines. Finally the third 
section studies non-nuclear marine pollutants and argues why they should be classified as global, 
rather than national security threats. In all three cases the sections examine the problems in terms 
of their origin, degree and possible effects on Canadian welfare. 
86 Leigh Sarty, "Environmental Security After Communism: The Debate," in Environmental 
Security and Quality after Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John Hannigan, (San 
Francisco: Westview Press, Inc., 1995), 20. 
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NUCLEAR WASTE 
The following discusses the extent of the nuclear waste buildup in the Russian Arctic and argues 
that the nuclear waste poses a security threat to the Canadian Arctic because of it potential threat 
to the well-being ofNorthern Canadians. More specifically, this chapter argues that the 
movement of pollutants through Arctic waters combined with the scale of nuclear waste created 
and dumped by the Soviet Union pose a security threat to Canada. 
Movement of Pollution through Arctic Waters 
The fact that the Arctic marine ecosystem is intraconnected means that pollution taking place in 
one area of the Arctic has a high probability of affecting other areas as well. In the case of 
nuclear waste build-up there are concerns that the dumped materials will leak substantially and 
that ocean movements will carry the waste to other areas. According to the Canadian Arctic 
Contaminants Assessment Report, the usual route of pollutants from the regions in the Laptev, 
Kara and Barents Seas is across the Arctic Ocean, exiting by the Fram Strait. There is also 
evidence that "the Transpolar Drift can at times migrate toward the Canadian ·side of the Arctic 
Ocean thereby delivering contaminated ice to the north of Greenland and into the Lincoln Sea. n8? 
From there, according to DIAND, the ice could eventually end up in the Canadian Arctic, at 
which time the ice " ... melts completely releasing its contaminant burden to the water. "88 This 
report is not the only source that suggests that nuclear contaminants from Northern Russia could 
find their way into the Canadian Arctic. Other oceanographers have noticed that surface water 
87 Canada. Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Canadian Arctic 
Contaminants Assessment Report (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Services, 1997), 85 . 
Hereafter referred to as DIAND, Canadian Arctic .. . 
88 The proposed route that the contaminated ice could travel in order to reach the Canadian 
Arctic from the north the Lincoln Sea is as follows : The ice could travel south into Nares Strait, 
west and then south into the Archipelago or further west to join the Beaufort Gyre. The transit of 
ice through Nares Strait or the Archipelago would take a year or two and it is during this time in 
which the ice melts and releases its contaminants to the water. DIAND, Canadian Arctic ... , 85. 
Refer to Map 2.1 for a mapping ofthe possible movement ofwaters into the Canadian Arctic. 
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from the Russian Arctic slowly circulates in a clockwise manner that tends to push pollutants 
toward Greenland and Canada. 89 Any large leakages in the future could carry radioactive 
materials to the shores of the Canadian Arctic, contaminating the water, wildlife and people of 
this region. The situation would be made even worse if the ocean currents carried the actual 
containers used for dumping to the Canadian Arctic. Since US scientists feel that the Arctic ice 
pack could gouge the sea bottom and break up the containers this is a real concern. What makes 
this even more alarming is that many of the containers are lying in shallow waters and the 
possibility of movement and transport is very real. 9° Furthermore, the scenario could prove even 
more lethal if transported containers were to start leaking or rupture once they had reached the 
Canadian coast. It is necessary to keep the very real possibility of transport in mind when 
considering the extent of the nuclear waste buildup in Russia. 
The Extent of the Build-up of Nuclear Waste in Russia 
The most telling feature in terms of the amount of nuclear waste created in the former Soviet 
Union is the extent to which the Soviet Union used the practice of dumping. While several 
countries have dumped nuclear waste into the seas and oceans of the world, none have used the 
practice as much as the former Soviet Union. In the 1960s the USSR began the regular practice 
of dumping large amounts ofliquid and solid radioactive waste in the area of the former USSR 
and more specifically in the Russian Arctic.91 For example in the provinces ofMurmansk and 
Arkhangel'sk the radioactivity dumped constitutes almost two-thirds of all radioactive waste ever 
89 Hal Bernton, "Russian Revelations Indicate Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants," 
Washington Post, (5 May 1993): A3 ; Olav Schram Stokke. Beauty and the Beast. Lysaker: 
FridtjofNansens Institutt, 1994, 5. 
90 Kirsti-Liisa Sjoeblom and Gordon S. Linsley, "International Arctic Seas Assessment Project 
(IASP)," in Environmental Radioactivity in the Arctic, edited by Per Strand and Andrew Cooke, 
(Norway: Scientific Committee ofEnvironmental Radioactivity, 1995), 16. 
91 Jason H. Eaton, "Kicking the habit: Russia's addiction to nuclear waste dumping at sea." 
Denver Journal of International Law and Policy no. 23 (Spring 1995): 292. 
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dumped in all the oceans ofthe world.92 In all Russia has dumped between 115, 000 TBq (3.1 
million Ci) and 333,000 TBq (9 million Ci) at sea. During the same time period all other 
countries combined have dumped 46,000 TBq (1.24 million Ci).93 This demonstrates the extent 
to which the Soviets used the practice of marine dumping. It also supports the assertion that the 
main source of nuclear contamination for the Arctic is Russia. Thus, by addressing the problem 
of nuclear waste in Northern Russia the risk of nuclear contamination for the Canadian Arctic is 
greatly lowered, because the main source of the threat has been addressed. The best way for the 
Canadian government to address the threat of nuclear waste, due to the fact that the source is 
easy to ascertain, is by viewing it as a national security threat and seeking bilateral or multilateral 
cooperation with Russia and the other Arctic states. 
Solid Waste 
Russian nuclear propelled ships, particularly the nuclear reactors form these ships, are the main 
sources of solid nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic. The Northern Fleet operates nuclear-
powered ships and submarines from five naval bases on the Kola Peninsula: Zapadnaya Litsa, 
Vidyaevo, Gadzhievo, Severomorsk and Gremikha. 94 The main problem contributing to the 
92 The province ofMurmansk covers the whole of the Kola Peninsula, as well as the eastern areas 
stretching northwards from Kandalakshya Bay to the Pechyenga Valley. The province of 
Arkhangel'sk encompasses the area to the south and east of the Kola Peninsula, including Novaya . 
Zemlya. See: Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, Sources to radioactive contamination in 
Murmansk and Arkhangel'sk counties, Bellona Report vol. 1 (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1994), 
12. Refer to Map 2.2 for a depiction of the area in question. 
93 Nilsen and Bohmer, 95 . The level of radioactivity in a source is measured in bequerel (Bq). 
The number ofbequerel is equal to the number ofradioactive reactions (disintegrations) per 
second. One curie (Ci) marks the radioactivity of 1 gram radium, and is equal to 37 billion Bq. 
Radioactivity itself is the process in which a disintegrating (decaying) atomic nucleus rids itself of 
excessive energy by emitting high energy radiation. For the full discussion of what radiation is 
and how it enters the human body refer to : Nilsen and Bohmer, 151 . Another good source 
describing radiation is: Rosalie Bertell, No Immediate Danger? (Toronto: Women's Educational 
Press, 1985 .) 
94 Thomas Nilsen, Igor Kudrik, and Alexander Nikitin. The Russian Northern Fleet: Sources of 
Radioactive Contamination, Bellona Report, vol.2, (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1996), 86. Refer 
to Map 2.2 for the location of these bases. 
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build-up of solid waste at these bases is the slow rate at which Russian authorities can 
decommission old submarines. The slow rate of decommissioning has caused the accumulation of 
old submarines at the bases, which has led to the Kola Peninsula (where the bases are located) 
being described as " ... a nuclear rubbish dump and an environmental horror story."95 The amount 
of radioactive material on nuclear submarines in one city alone, Severodvinsk, is twenty times 
greater than the radioactivity released by Chernobyl. 96 The main threat from a city like 
Severodvinsk stems from the sheer amount of the nuclear waste that could possibly contaminate 
Arctic waters. 
The Andreeva Bay, located on the northern tip of the Kola peninsula, is also home to a great 
deal of radioactive waste. The waste includes 21 ,000 spent nuclear fuel assemblies and about 
12,000 cubic meters of solid and liquid radioactive waste. 97 At this site there is a special area for 
solid radioactive waste located 200 meters from the sea, where Russian officials have stored half 
of the waste in a concrete bunker, while the rest is stored in an open area beside the bunker. 
Officials have only placed one third of the waste in the open area into containers. 98 In total the 
Russian government stores about 6000 cubic meters of solid radioactive waste at this site and the 
area surrounding the storage facility is contaminated. 99 The lack of proper precautions aptly 
demonstrates the need for more funding and storage facilities. 
95 Sally Bogle, "Kola: it's the real thing." Energy Economist (May 1996): 13 . 
96 Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the Soviet Regime 
(New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 48 . As of 1995 these facilities contained 
12,530 cubic meters of solid radioactive. See Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 119. 
97 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin, 95 . 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
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Dumping 
The build-up of nuclear waste described above led the Soviet Union to dump large amounts of 
nuclear waste into the Arctic seas. For example the Soviet Union has sank around 17,000 
containers, laden with radioactive waste, reactor parts and other radioactively contaminated 
equipment, directly into the Kara and Barents Seas.100 Most alarmingly, the Soviet Union 
dumped a number of reactors and containers in the shallow waters offthe coast ofNovaya 
Zemlya. Six of the reactors contained spent nuclear fuel which is highly radioactive.101 While 
the Soviets filled these reactors with a hardening mixture, which was designed to prevent salt-
water exposure to radioactive sources for up to 500 years, these measures along with others are 
suspect and thus create a concern.102 In fact, according to Rob Edwards, an unpublished report 
by the International Atomic Energy Agency's marine laboratory reveals that the waste containers 
have already begun to leak. Although the report admits that there is not a significant radiological 
leakage, the assumption is that they will continue to leak in the future, thus increasing the 
radioactivity in the area. 103 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the Russians dumped 
many of the containers and the reactors in shallow bays that range from depths of 20 to 50 
meters.104 While a recent joint Norwegian-Russian group found only low level localized 
contamination near the dumped wastes, concerns centre around the possibility of large leaks in the 
future, as well as the movement of containers from this area to other parts of the Arctic.105 As 
was discussed above there is a very real possibility that some of the containers and any 
100 Thomas B. Cochran, RobertS. Norris and Oleg A. Bukharin. Making the Russian Bomb. 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995) 219; Nilsen and Bohmer, 98, 103 . Refer to Map 2.3 for detailed 
look at the dumping sites. 
101 Rob Edwards, "Northern Exposure," New Scientist no. 1994 (September 9, 1995): 32. 
102 Eaton, 293 . 
103 Edwards, 32. 
104 Sjoeblom and Linsley, 15 . 
105 Ibid 16 ., . 
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radioactivity released from the containers could find their way to the Canadian Arctic. The 
greatest threat to Northern Canadians comes from the possibility of the actual containers being 
transported to the Canadian Arctic and then exposing their radioactive materials. If the 
radioactivity within the containers was released once it reached the Canadian Arctic, the result 
would be a much larger dosage of radioactive exposure for Northern Canadians. 
Liquid Waste 
Since 1959 the Soviet Union has dumped liquid radioactive cooling water from ship reactors at 
sea. The last known dumping of liquid radioactive waste by the Soviets was in November of 
1991. During this period the Soviet Union dumped at least 3.7 TBq (100 Ci) ofliquid radioactive 
waste in the White Sea, 451 TBq (12, 171 Ci) in the Barents Sea, and 315 TBq (8,500 Ci) in the 
Kara Sea.106 
The main reason that the Soviets dumped the waste instead of storing it is that every refueling 
of a nuclear submarine produces about 10 cubic meters of high level radioactive waste107 and 
there is a lack of adequate storage facilities for this waste. In order to demonstrate the extent of 
the problem it is interesting to note that at the present time the Northern Fleet stores more than 
7,000 cubic meters ofliquid radioactive waste at naval bases and yards. The Fleet has stored 
liquid waste in either floating tanks, tanks on shore or on board service ships which are all nearly 
full and some are close to overflowing.108 For example the storage capacity on the Kola 
Peninsula for liquid radioactive waste is full and new facilities must be built to accommodate the 
106 Nilsen and Bohmer, 12. Refer to Map 2.4 for a detailed look at the dumping site locations. It 
is important to note that these figures do not include any accidental leakages, only planned 
dumpings. 
107 There is also large amounts of low and medium level radioactive waste produced. (Nilsen, 
Kudrik and Nikitin, 88.) 
108 Ibid. 
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yearly accumulation of waste. The lack of adequate storage facilities may mean that the Northern 
Fleet may resort to dumping liquid radioactive waste directly into Arctic waters again. This 
would once again increase the amount of radioactive contaminants in the Arctic, which combined 
with other threats of radioactive contamination, pose a threat to the welfare ofNorthern 
Canadians. 
Major Sources of Arctic Contamination From Southern Russian 
While the main focus of this chapter is concerned with pollution from the Russian Arctic, there 
are some sources from within the Russian interior that pollute rivers that flow into the Arctic 
Ocean and thus can pose a threat to the Canadian Arctic. One of the more disturbing sources of 
radioactive contamination from the interior of Russia is the discovery that the former Soviet 
Union has injected liquid radioactive waste directly into the ground for over three decades. In 
fact the Soviet Union has injected an estimated 3 billion curies of nuclear waste into three sites in 
Russia. 109 It is interesting to note, as a point of comparison, that Chernobyl only released 50 
million curies of radioactivity and Three Mile Island released just 50 curies. This method of 
disposing of nuclear waste violates the accepted rules for waste disposal, which requires states to · 
isolate nuclear waste in impermeable containers. However, Russian scientists claim that the 
practice is safe due to the fact that they have injected the waste under a layer of shale and clay. In 
theory the shale and clay should cut off the wastes from reaching the Earth's surface.110 
Unfortunately wastes at one site have already leaked beyond the expected range and have spread 
across an unknown distance. Since two of the injection sites are located near rivers running into 
the Arctic Ocean the unexpected leakage is cause for concern. 111 These two sites are near 
109 William Broad, "Pumping poison," Vancouver Sun, 24 December 1994, B6. 
110 Ibid 
111 Ibid 
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Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk, not far from the Ob and Yenisei rivers respectively. Any potential 
spreading of the waste at these sites could contaminate the Arctic through these rivers. 
The injection of nuclear waste into the ground is not the only threat posed to the Arctic from 
southern sources. Another threat originates from two of the main nuclear weapons production 
facilities in Russia. The Chemical Combine at Seversk, near Tomsk, has released contaminated 
cooling water into the Tom river, which drains into the Ob, since 1956.112 The main source of 
concern stemming from Seversk is that storage ponds might fail to contain the nuclear waste and 
thereby contaminate ground water.113 The result of a broken dam or accident at the site could be 
a sudden large release of radioactivity, which would be transported to the Arctic. 
The Mayak Enterprise near Chelyabinsk is also another source of concern, since it has 
accumulated over 120 million curies of radioactivity, mainly from nuclear bomb construction, in 
holding reservoirs. These reservoirs are in danger of overflowing into rivers which drain into the 
Arctic Ocean.114 Radioactive elements from Mayak have penetrated the northern rivers and pose 
a problem for the Arctic Ocean. The problem was even worse when the Mayak operation was 
first set up between 1949 and 1951 , and these reservoirs were not even present. Instead Mayak 
officials simply poured the radioactive liquid waste directly into the Techa River, which is a 
tributary of the Ob River.115 A recent study of the population living along the Techa River has 
112 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic 
Environment Report (Oslo: AMAP, 1997), 115 . Hereafter referred to as AMAP. 
113 Ibid 115-116 ., . 
114 Peter Gizewski, "Military Activity and Environmental Security: the Case ofRadioactivity in 
the Arctic," Northern Perspectives 21 , vol. 4 (1993-1994): 17. A more recent version is found in 
Environmental Security and Quality After Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John 
Hannigan, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995 . 
115 Mark Chao, "Report from Chelyabinsk," New Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and 
Occupational Health Policy 3, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 62. 
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tentatively shown that there was a "statistically confirmed increase in total cancer mortality during 
the period 1950-1982 ... ," in exposed residents ofthe region.116 While the estimates were lower 
than those for atomic bomb survivors, this appears to be due to the prolonged exposure of the 
Techa river population in comparison to the acute high dosage of atomic bomb survivors. The 
study concluded: "In general, the risks per unit absorbed dose for the Techa riverside populations 
are comparable for the selected solid cancers to those from their Hiroshima-Nagasaki cohorts."117 
The study significantly demonstrates that there are links between radioactive contamination and 
cancer rate increases that can result from nuclear waste build-up and accidental or intentional 
dumping of waste. 
The present and future threat for the Arctic is that the present storage ponds at the Mayak 
facility will fail to contain the waste. AMAP suggests that a total dam failure is a possibility and if 
this were to occur the radionuclides would flow into the Asanow Swamp and then into the Techa 
River and eventually into the Arctic Ocean via the Ob.118 Another possible threat, according to 
AMAP, could come from the drying out of the Asanow Swamp due to a drought, which followed 
by floods could wash the radionuclides into the Ob. 119 Once radionuclides have reached the 
Arctic there is the possibility that they will reach the Canadian Arctic. In all three of the above 
cases it is the amount of waste along with the possibilities for Arctic contamination that pose a 
116 The study of the Techa river population comprised 28,000 persons exposed to radiation on 
the banks of the Techa river. Mira M. Kossenko and Marina 0 . Degteva, "Cancer Mortality and 
Radiation Risk Evaluation for the Techa River Population," The Science of the Total 
Environment 142 (1994) : 88 . 
117 The estimates of the relative risk for cancer of esophagus, stomach and lung were found to 
not be substantially different from the corresponding values for atomic bomb survivors. In 
addition to this incidents ofleukemia for the Techa River population, while lower than atomic 
bomb survivors, were estimated to be greater for the exposed population. Kossenko and 
Degteva, 83 , 88 . 
118 AMAP 115 ' . 
119 Ibid. 
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threat to the Canadian Arctic. If the amount of contamination were minimal a threat would really 
not exist to the Canadian Arctic (there would still be a threat to local communities); however, the 
amount of nuclear waste is anything but minimal and thus does pose a threat to more than simply 
local areas in Russia. 
Security Threat to Canada 
The massive build-up of old submarines and nuclear waste in the Russian Arctic poses a threat to 
the entire Arctic region, including the Canadian Arctic. Besides the fact that the Soviet Union 
dumped large amounts of waste into the Arctic Ocean, there is also a concern over the safety of 
the storage devices used by the Soviets. The best example of reasons for uncertainty over the 
safety of the containers comes from the first dumping missions in the 1960s. On these dumping 
missions many of the containers did not sink and the crew members aboard the boats shot the 
containers to facilitate sinking through the seepage of water into the containers. 120 There have 
also been repeated finds of radioactive containers floating in the Kara Sea or washing up on 
shore. There are also concerns about the thickness of the containers. It is thought that because 
the containers were so thin that it might be possible for radioactive material to reach the ocean, 
through erosion, within 10 years of dumping. 121 The combination of large amounts of waste, 
inadequate storage facilities and devices and the possibility for marine transport to the Canadian 
North present a very real threat to the health and welfare ofNorthern Canadians. Since, Russia is 
the largest and main source of nuclear waste in the Arctic, the threat can be dealt with bilaterally 
or better yet multilaterally and does not need a global forum. 
NUCLEAR SUBMARINE ACCIDENTS 
Accidents involving nuclear-powered submarines could transport radioactive contaminants in a 
similar route to the discussion of the possible movement of nuclear wastes to the Canadian Arctic 
120 Nilsen and Bohmer, 103 . 
121 Eaton, 293 . 
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via water currents . In addition to this, both of these threats have one main source (Russia) and 
have the possibility of seriously harming the welfare of Canadians. In terms of nuclear submarine 
accidents the greatest threat stems from the possibility of an accident in Canadian waters, because 
this would increase the dosage of radioactivity felt by Northern Canadians and thus also increase 
the damage to their health and welfare. 
The spectrum of nuclear submarine accidents includes accidents at sea as well as accidents 
during refueling or decommissioning. The Bellona Foundation suggests that the Russian Navy's 
Northern Fleet has had several accidents during both situations and that their facilities and 
equipment are in a catastrophic state. 122 The equipment includes some 182 working nuclear 
reactors and 135 non-functioning reactors in the Arkhagel'sk-Murmansk region. The large 
number of reactors found here, combined with their age and poor condition, has led authorities 
such as Murray Feshbach to suggest that the aging nuclear fleet is a potential time bomb for the 
Arctic Ocean. 123 According to Feshbach there have been "more than fifty 'serious accidents' 
during the operation and maintenance of the nuclear submarines of the Northern Fleet. 124 In fact, 
between 1989 and 1993 alone the Northern Fleet experienced ten accidents on board their nuclear 
submarines. These accidents are potential sources of nuclear contamination and thus are 
discussed more thoroughly in the following section. 
The K-19 Accident 
It is appropriate to start out the examination of nuclear submarine accidents by discussing the 
story ofthe first nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarine, the K-19, in the Soviet fleet. The 
story is particularly interesting because it sets the stage for the long list of accidents and problems 
122 Nilsen, Kudrik and Nikitin. 
123 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 45 . 
124 Ibid 
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experienced by the Russian Fleet. During one of its voyages the K-19 had a nuclear reactor 
cooling accident which threatened to incinerate the ship.125 The crew members quickly welded a 
new cooling system which saved the submarine but exposed them to extreme amounts of 
radiation. Of the twenty two men killed, six were rumored to be so radioactive that officials 
secretly entombed their corpses.126 Thus began the program of the nuclear-propelled ballistic 
missile submarines in Russia. Since then the nuclear propulsion program has ballooned 
immensely: Russia now has around 235 nuclear-powered warships; 13 icebreakers with reactors; 
230 nuclear-powered submarines and an additional 100 submarines waiting for 
decommissioning. 127 
Komsomolets Accident 
The most recent submarine accident to spark interest in the media and abroad was that of the 
Komsomolets. Whereas the K-19 survived, the Komsomolets actually sank about 300 miles off 
the Norwegian coast in 1989. 128 In this accident not only were there environmental concerns but 
41 crewmen lost their lives. The main source of environmental concern was the fact that when 
the submarine hit the ocean floor at a depth of 5, 525 feet it exploded and the explosion breached 
the titanium hull and damaged two nuclear torpedoes. 129 Estimates predicted that water would 
reach the plutonium in the torpedoes within five to six years. One study, performed in the early 
1990s, warned that corrosion of the warheads would lead to an "uncontrolled" and "impulsive" 
leak of plutonium by 1996-1997. 130 A major source of concern was the possible contamination 
125 Eaton, 287. 
126 Ibid 
127 Ibid, 290. 
128 Ibid , 293-294. 
129 Ibid, 293 . 
130 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 44. 
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offishstalks used by N01wegian and Russian fishers . One Russian expert estimated that the 
possible loss to the fishing industry could amount to $2 (US) million for the Russians and $2(US) 
billion for the Norwegians.131 Other estimates suggested that ifthe nuclear materials were 
released slowly, the toxicity would be harmless due to the movement of the seas.132 However, 
no one wanted to take a wait-and-see approach to a possible environmental catastrophe. Under 
great public and international pressure the Russian government commenced securing the 
Komsomolets with cement in June of 1994.133 They finished cementing the Komsomolets in 
August of 1994 and most experts believe that the sunken submarine no longer poses a threat. 134 
However, this accident does demonstrate the threat posed from submarine accidents and serves as 
a good example of the possibility of these accidents occurring. If the Komsomolets had sunk in 
Canadian Arctic waters the threat of contamination would have involved Northern Canadians as 
opposed to Norwegian and Russian citizens. The inability to predict where the next accident of 
the Northern Fleet will occur means that most of the countries in the Arctic, including Canada, 
are at risk of contamination. 
The two accidents discussed above are probably the best known accidents, but it is important 
to remember that they are only two out of a total of 50 serious accidents concerning the Northern 
Fleet. Four other serious accidents merit mention as a further illustration of the dangers posed 
from this fleet: 
1. An emergency on a nuclear submarine in July 1989, when cracks appeared in the casing 
for the reactor's cooling system. 
2. Two fires aboard a nuclear submarine moored at Severodvinsk in December 1990 
3. A fire aboard a submarine in the Barents Sea in May 1992 
131 Ibid. , 45 . 
132 Ibid. , 44. 
133 Ibid. , 45 
134 Radio Moscow, "Sealing ofKomsomolets Nuclear Sub Completed," August 1, 1994, 
transcribed in FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-94-147, August 1, 1994, 20. 
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4. Two fires on Northern Fleet submarines as recently as 199313 5 
These recent accidents demonstrate that the problem is not going away and may in fact be getting 
worse due to the aging of the fleet. In fact the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme's 
1997 report suggests that nuclear powered vessel accidents pose a risk to the Arctic and need to 
be addressed. 136 
Even though other countries have nuclear submarines, the age of the Russian Northern Fleet 
and the numerous accidents that the fleet has experienced suggests that it is more dangerous than 
other fleets . Since the Northern Fleet operates mainly in the Arctic the threat posed by the fleet is 
limited to the Arctic countries, of which Canada has the second largest area. Thus, the threat is 
national or regional in nature as opposed to global. 
Accidents During Decommissioning and Refueling 
Two of the most problematic tasks involved in servicing nuclear submarines are the refueling and 
decommissioning of the submarines. Since these procedures take place in Russian waters they 
pose a risk to surrounding areas, but are not as great of a threat to Canada. The following 
examines the dangers involved with refueling and decommissioning, but suggests that they are 
more local threats and not as pertinent to Canadian security as accidents happening in Canadian 
waters. 
The highest risk work is the refueling of submarine reactors. 137 Russian officials perform the 
refueling process at shipbuilding yards and on floating bases. The most dangerous operation 
involved in the refueling process is the removal of the reactor lid. Past accidents during this 
procedure have shown that significant amounts of radioactivity can be released into the air and 
135 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 45 . 
136 AMAP 124 , . 
137 Nilsen, Kudrik, and Nikitin, 37. 
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water. 138 According to AMAP this spread of radioactivity is fairly localized.139 Thus, the threat 
to Canada is less than in some of the other cases discussed earlier. 
Another process that can cause accidents is the decommissioning of nuclear submarines. The 
process is dangerous under normal circumstances, but in Russia there appears to be an even 
greater danger. The problem is that Russia lacks essential facilities for the dismantling of the 
vessels and the storage of the nuclear wastes. 14° Furthermore the staff performing the process 
are not always properly trained in safety measures. Making the situation even worse is the lack of 
funding available to the Northern Fleet. According to the Russian Ministry ofDefence, at the 
present level of funding it will be impossible to solve any of the problems facing the Northern 
Fleet. 141 At the same time the number of submarines in need of decommissioning increases every 
year. As the age of the fleet increases, so does the possibility of further accidents. The authors of 
the Bellona Foundation Report on the Northern Fleet suggest that the situation is urgent and that 
action must be taken quickly.142 At the present time a lack of funds and adequate technology 
means that the Northern Fleet decommissions less than one and a half submarines a year. 143 As it 
stands now naval yard authorities feel that it will not be possible to have safe decommissions of 
nuclear submarines in Russia for at least another five to seven years, and only then if they receive 
adequate funding .144 The Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme report views the 
disposal of old nuclear submarines as a major problem for the future, due to the lack of storage 
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sites and the problems with decommissioning.145 Accidents involving decommissioning only 
involve a fairly localized area, and the main threat to Canada caused by the decommissioning of 
nuclear submarines stems from the nuclear waste created, as discussed earlier. 
Security Threat to Canada 
The possibility of nuclear-powered submarine accidents in the Russian Arctic poses a threat to the 
entire Arctic region, including the Canadian Arctic. The pollution from any submarine accidents 
within Arctic waters could possibly be transported to Canadian waters. This of course includes 
accidents during refueling and decommissioning which can also spread radioactivity. An even 
greater threat comes from the free movement of nuclear submarines in Arctic waters, including 
Canadian waters. Since Canada has no way of really monitoring its Arctic waters it is difficult to 
detect where nuclear submarines are. It is very likely that Russian and American nuclear 
submarines have entered and continue to enter Canadian Arctic waters. Any type of accident 
within these waters would pose an even greater security threat to the Canadian Arctic, due to the 
increased load of radioactivity that would be felt with an accident in such close proximity to 
Canadian land and people. Since, it is impossible to determine where the next accident will take 
place the whole issue of nuclear submarine accidents and their operating safety in the Arctic poses 
a threat to Canada. 
Effects of Radioactive Contamination 
The previous sections demonstrated the possibility for the nuclear contamination of the Canadian 
Arctic, via marine transport, from the buildup of nuclear waste and the possible nuclear submarine 
accidents. The threat of contamination is very real, but what are the implications of radioactivity 
on the population and territory of the Canadian Arctic and why can this be seen as a national 
security threat? The effect of elevated levels of radioactivity on the health of populations has 
been hard to substantiate. This of course does not include strong radiation doses, known as acute 
145 AMAP 124 ' . 
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radiation illness, which can cause death within 48 hours due to the destruction of the central 
nervous system.146 Long term effects of elevated levels of radiation, which some scientists have 
linked to different types of cancer and genetic alteration, is also a source of concem.147 Thus the 
spread of nuclear contaminants from the Russian Arctic could result in an increase in cancer 
patients and birth defects in the Canadian North. Furthermore, it threatens the wildlife and 
territory of the Canadian Arctic, which many Canadian Northerners rely on for subsistence. The 
fact that possible nuclear submarine accidents in Canadian waters and the transport of nuclear 
waste containers to the Canadian Arctic could result in even stronger doses of radioactivity calls 
for large-scale action by the Canadian government. 
Obviously the threat of contamination is not present solely to the Canadian Arctic, but rather 
affects the entire Arctic population. This does not however, mean that the Canadian government 
cannot view the problem of nuclear contamination from Russia as a threat to Canadian national 
security. What is necessary is that the Canadian government should seek to cooperate with other 
Arctic countries in meeting the challenges of this threat. The multilateral approach is similar to 
the strategy taken concerning military threats to Canada. For example the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization was a similar type of response to what was seen as a national security threat, the 
Soviet Union, to several countries. 
NON-NUCLEAR POLLUTION AND THE CANADIAN ARCTIC: 
NATIONAL OR GLOBAL SECURITY THREAT? 
This section discusses non-nuclear threats to the Arctic in order to demonstrate the differences 
between global and national security threats. The main difference that can be ascertained is that 
most of the non-nuclear threats originate from southern areas and need a global forum in order to 
146 Nilsen and Bohmer, 151. 
147 Ibid. 
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be addressed properly. When differentiating between a global and a national security threat it is 
necessary to determine the source of the threat. If the threat comes from a specific and defined 
area then it is easier to address as a national security threat; however if the threat is due to the 
actions of many states there is a need for a more global response. Thus it is not only the localized 
nature of a threat that determines it to be a national security threat, but also the source of the 
threat. 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) 
Recently persistent organic pollutants (POPs) have surfaced as a major concern for the global 
environment. Global water circulation brings organic pollutants to the Arctic over long distances 
causing effects on the health of animals and people in the Arctic.148 Two of the better known 
organic pollutants are DDT and PCBs. PCBs, for example, became an issue for the north in the 
late 1980s, when human mother's milk at Broughton Island in the Northwest Territories was 
found to contain enough PCBs to cause concern about the possible health effects.149 Scientists 
have also found DDT in the Arctic and since the circumpolar countries restricted its use twenty 
years ago, the presence ofDDT in the north is attributed to southern uses. Southern Asia, Africa, 
Central and South America and Europe still use DDT for pest control. 150 Some Russians still use 
DDT in Siberia, but it appears that most of the DDT is transported into the Arctic via both water 
and air currents from the south. 151 In fact the Canadian Arctic Contaminants Assessment Report 
148 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, The Arctic Environmental 
Strategy: An Action Plan, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991), 4. Hereafter referred 
to as DIAND, The Arctic Environmental. .. 
149 AMAP 72 ' . 
150 Ibid 74 ., . 
151 Ibid. I have chosen to include POPs under marine transport because they are transported by 
both water and air, while the non-nuclear contaminants discussed in the next chapter are 
transported almost solely by air. 
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suggests that the majority ofPOPs originate from sources external to the Arctic.152 Since the 
exact origins ofPOPs are difficult to document they are best dealt with at the global level. 
Why are POPs Global and not National Security Threats? 
The fact that most POPs cycle around in the global environment before they reach their 
destination makes them a threat that affects almost every state.153 In addition to this L. A. 
Barrie, et. al. suggest that POPs are a " .. . truly global problem" since they are " ... capable of re-
entering the atmosphere once deposited to the Earth's surface [or waters]. "154 Since POPs have 
the ability to circle the planet, they affect nearly every state in existence. POPs not only affect 
several countries, but also originate from several countries. There may be some significant 
sources ofPOPs within the Arctic region; however, they are not the only or even the greatest 
sources of these pollutants. The Canadian government requires a different approach in order to 
deal with these truly global threats. Global threats need an international solution, which would be 
sought through large international organizations such as the United Nations. While it may be 
difficult at the present time to address these global threats, due to the primacy of the nation-state, 
large scale international co-operation is possible and should be attempted for these types of 
environmental issues. 
CONCLUSION 
The build-up of radioactive contaminants in the Russian Arctic contains both long term and 
immediate threats to the Canadian Arctic. According to Feshbach, reports of radioactive caribou 
in the North American Arctic demonstrate that the nuclear contamination in the Russian Arctic 
152 DIAND, Canadian Arctic ... , 419. 
153 AMAP 76 ' . 
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has already made its way into the Canadian border.155 The Canadian government should assess 
and address the potential environmental threats to Canada before the nuclear contamination 
becomes too great. 
The biggest security threat, via marine pollution, for the present time stems from the use of 
nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic. Any type of nuclear-powered submarine accident in 
the Arctic would contaminate local areas and possibly other areas as well. If an accident were to 
occur in Canadian Arctic waters the contamination would be even greater and thus more harmful 
to northern Canadians. The Canadian government needs to take preventative action with respect 
to the use of nuclear-powered submarines in the Arctic. The biggest future threat posed to the 
Canadian Arctic by marine pollution comes from the massive build-up of radioactive waste in the 
Russian Arctic seas and territory. The possibility of radioactive containers being transported is 
fairly high and only time will tell whether the containers will continue to separate their radioactive 
contents from the seas in the future. Any massive radioactive contamination would seriously 
threaten the lives of northern Canadians as well as the Canadian Arctic ecology. This external 
threat is similar (although to a lesser extent) to the threat of nuclear war with Russia in the past, in 
terms of the radioactive contamination that would result. The fact is that Canada was not 
contaminated by radioactive active materials due to a hit from a nuclear strike from Russia during 
the Cold War. Now the possibility of nuclear contamination, from the pollution ofthe Russian 
Arctic, may prove to be the first nuclear "hit" (unintentional) on Canada from Russia. 
Although no one can say for sure if serious contamination will occur there is one thing that is 
known. The fact is that radioactive contamination has lasting effects which harm present and 
future generations. Even a decade after the Chernobyl fallout health and economic problems due 
-
to the accident are still emerging and growing.156 It would seem imperative that for its own 
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security the Canadian government should provide financial support to help clean up the nuclear 
waste dumped in the Russian Arctic. Furthermore, open political support of moderates in Russia 
is needed on the international stage. Any retreat to a Cold War mentality could cause even 
greater harm to befall the Russian Arctic and thus the Arctic region as a whole. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Marine pollution from Russia is not the only threat to Canadian national security. No less 
important are the contaminants that are transported by air. This chapter focuses on the 
atmospheric pollution emanating from Russia and assesses both the sources of the pollution and 
its potential threat to Canada. The examination involves two types of nuclear sources (nuclear 
testing and nuclear plants) and two types of non-nuclear pollution (heavy metals and arctic haze 
and acidification). The first main section examines the nuclear pollution and suggests that this 
problem does pose a security threat to Canada. The next section examines non-nuclear pollution 
and suggests that while these are problems and may pose security threats to other countries, such 
as Finland and Norway, they are not security threats to Canada. 
NUCLEAR CONTAMINANTS 
Russian nuclear testing and the possibility of accidents at Russian nuclear power plants are both 
potential sources of nuclear contamination for the Canadian North. The main reason for this is 
that air circulation from Russia during winter usually swings over the pole and any contaminants 
fall most heavily around Greenland, Spitsbergen and Canada. The fallout is due to the intense 
Siberian high pressure cell which tends to force air northward from Russia, during the winter and 
then the air is driven out of the Arctic southward over North America.157 In the summer the flow 
of air is clockwise which also means that contaminated air from Russia can reach the Canadian 
North.158 Thus, radioactive contamination from nuclear tests on Novaya Zemlya or possible 
reactor accidents in Russia can be transported to the Canadian Arctic via air transport. In 
157 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, Canadian Arctic 
Contaminants Assessment Report (Ottawa: Minister ofPublic Works and Services, 1997), 41. 
Hereafter referred to as DIAND. Canadian Arctic .. ; Hal Bernton, "Russian Revelations Indicate 
Arctic Region Is Awash in Contaminants," Washington Post, 5 May 1993, A3. Refer to Map 3.1 
for a diagram of the air circulation in winter months. 
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Map 3.1 
Arctic Air Ciruclation 
The Westerlies blow in an anticlockwise direction almost 
parallel to the contours at a speea propomonar w mt: yradient. 
Source: Sugden, 46. 
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addition to the dispersal of the radioactivity is the problem of the long life of many radioactive 
elements. Fallout from all past atmospheric weapons testing is still a major source of plutonium 
isotopes in the Arctic.159 The long term aspect of radioactivity means that the contamination 
will be a concern for years to come. 
The circulation of Arctic air along with the poor condition ofRussian nuclear power plants 
and past Soviet nuclear testing pose a security threat to Northern Canadians due to the possibility 
of radioactive contamination. In both of these nuclear cases the source of the threat comes 
directly from Russia and an even greater threat in the case of nuclear reactors comes from 
reactors present in the Russian North. While other countries have nuclear power plants and have 
tested nuclear weapons, none of these countries can compare with Russia in terms of possible 
accidents and the magnitude of tests. Moreover, in terms of the north, Russia is the only real 
threat. For this reason it is easier for the Canadian government to address this threat through 
bilateral and multilateral negotiations, than by viewing the issue as a global environmental threat. 
Nuclear Testing 
At the present time Russia is a signatory of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which 
disallows any type of nuclear tests. This means that the present threat from nuclear testing in the 
Arctic has diminished; however, a threat of nuclear contamination from past testing does exist due 
to the magnitude ofthe previous tests and possible venting of radioactivity due to seismic activity. 
The threat also exists that military establishments in Russia will convince the government (or a 
new hard line government will come to power) to recommence testing at Novaya Zemlya. Either 
way there is a possibility for the Canadian North to be hit by nuclear contaminants. This in turn 
would potentially cause the health and welfare effects that Chapter Two discussed. 
159 Peter Gizewski, "Military Activity and Environmental Security: The Case ofRadioactivity in 
the Arctic," Northern Perspectives (21 April 1993-1994): 17. A more recent version is found in 
Environmental Security and Quality After Communism, edited by Joan DeBardeleben and John 
Hannigan, San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995 . 
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Both the United States and the USSR performed several nuclear tests in the Arctic, at 
Amchitka Island (US) and at Novaya Zemlya (USSR), as a part of their military program during 
the Cold War. 160 There is little public information available on the American testing at Amchitka 
Island, but fortunately a good deal of information exists on the Soviet testing. Between 1949 and 
1990 the Soviet Union performed 715 nuclear test explosions, ofwhich 215 were detonated in the 
atmosphere (1949-1962) . The rest were underground tests except for three underwater tests.161 
These tests mainly took place at two centres in the former Soviet Union. One was at 
Sernipalatinsk (in what is now the independent country of Kazakhstan) and the other was at 
Novaya Zemlya (now in the independent Russian Federation). 
The Soviet Union detonated the first nuclear explosion on Novaya Zemlya in September of 
1955; since then it has detonated 132 nuclear bombs at the island.162 In comparison to 
Sernipalatinsk the Soviet Union did not detonate as large of a number of bombs at Novaya 
Zemlya. However, the combined explosive force of all Soviet detonations is approximately 500 
megatons, and the Soviet Union detonated 470 of these megatons at Novaya Zemlya. 163 
160 Ibid. 
161 Thomas Nilsen and Nils Bohmer, Sources to Radioactive Contamination in Murmansk and 
Arkhangel'sk Counties, Bellona Report vol. 1 (Oslo : Bellona Foundation, 1994), 120. For a 
detailed list of the nuclear tests refer to Tables 3.1 and 3.2. 
162 Nilsen and Bohmer, 120-121. Murray Feshbach suggests the number oftests is 118 as 
opposed to 132. Murray Feshbach, Ecological Disaster: Cleaning Up the Hidden Legacy of the 
Soviet Regime (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1995), 43 . 
163 The explosive force of a nuclear bomb is measured in kilotons or megatons. A kiloton 
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Table 3.1 
Nuclear Atmospheric Tests at Novaya Zemlya 
Atmospheric test explosions over Novaya Zemlya (1957-1962). 
No. Date Time Explosive No. Date Time Explosive 
force force 
24th of September 1957 09.00 Mt -size 41 27th of October 1961 08.30 Small 
2 6th of October 1957 08.58 Unknown 42 30th of October 1961 08.33 58 Mt 
3 10th of October 1957 06.55 Small 43 31st of October 1961 08.29 Several Mt 
4 23rd of February 1958 Mt -size 44 31st of October 1961 08.38 1 Mt 
5 27th of February 1958 07.59 Mt -size 45 2nd of November 1961 08.41 Small 
6 27th of February 1958 10.24 Large 46 2nd of November 1961 . Small 
7 14th of March 1958 >1 Mt 47 4th of November 1961 07.20 Several Mt 
8 20th of March 1958 Small 48 5th of August 1962 09.09 30 Mt 
9 22nd of March 1958 Medium 49 1Oth of August 1962 09.00 1 Mt 
10 20th of September 1958 . so 20th of August 1962 09.02 Several Mt 
11 30th of September 1958 07 .50 Medium 51 22nd of August 1962 09 .00 Mt 
12 30th of September 1958 09.55 Medium 52 25th of August 1962 09.00 Several Mt 
13 2nd of October 1958 08.00 Moderate 53 27th of August 1962 09.00 Several Mt 
14 2nd of October 1958 09.01 Moderate 54 1st of September 1962 12.40 
15 5th of October 1958 06.00 55 2nd of September 1962 Mt 
16 10th of October 1958 07.51 Large 56 8th of September 1962 10. 18 Mt -size 
17 12th of October 1958 07.53 Mt -size 57 15th of September 1962 08.02 Several Mt 
18 15th of October 1958 07.51 Mt -size 58 16th of September 1962 10.59 Several Mt 
19 18th of October 1 958 09.51 Mt -size 59 18th of September 1962 08.29 A few Mt 
20 19th of October 1958 07.27 Small 60 19th of September 1962 11 .00 20 Mt 
21 20th of October 1958 08.20 Mt -size 61 21st of September 1962 08.01 A few Mt 
22 22nd of October 1958 08.21 Mt -size 62 25th of September 1962 13.03 25 Mt 
23 24th of October 1958 08.03 Mt -size 63 27th of September 1 962 08.03 > 30 Mt 
24 25th of October 1958 08.20 Large 64 7th of October 1962 16.32 Medium 
25 10th of September 1961 09.00 Several Mt 65 22nd of October 1 962 09.06 Several Mt 
26 10th of September 1961 . Some Kt 66 27th of October 1962 07 .35 Medium 
27 12th of September 1961 10.08 Several Mt 67 29th of October 1962 07 .35 Medium 
28 13th of September 1961 . Small 68 30th of October 1 962 Medium 
29 14th of September 1961 09.56 Several Mt 69 1st of November 1962 06 .30 Medium 
30 16th of September 1961 09.08 Medium 70 3rd of November 1962 08 .31 Medium 
31 18th of September 1961 07.59 Mt 71 3rd of November 1962 Medium 
32 20th of September 1961 08.12 Mt 72 18th of December 1962 Medium 
33 22nd of September 1961 08.01 Mt 73 18th of December 1962 - Medium 
34 2nd of October 1961 10.31 Mt 74 20th of December 1962 • Medium 
35 4th of October 1961 07.30 Several Mt 75 22nd of December 1962 • Medium 
36 6th of October 1961 07 .00 Several Mt 76 23rd of December 1962 11 . 1 5 A few Mt 
37 8th of October 1961 Small 77 24th of December 1962 10.44 Unknown 
38 20th of October 1961 Several Mt 78 24th of December 1962 11 . 1 1 20 Mt 
39 23rd of October 1961 08.31 25 Mt 79 25th of December 1962 13 .35 A few Mt 
40 25th of October 1961 08.33 1 Mt 
Mt=megaton(s) Source: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Databook. Volum IV 
Kt=kiloton(s) 
Cited in: Nilsen and Bohmer, 123 . 
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Table 3.2 
Nuclear Underground Tests at Novaya Zemlya 
I Underground test explosions on Novaya Zemlya 
/ No. Date Time Explosive No. Date 
i 1 force 
Time Explosive 
18th of September 1964 07.59 2 Kt 19 
force 
2 27th of October 1966 05.57 422 Kt 
1st of September 1977 02.59 55 Kt 
3 21st of October 1967 
20 9th of October 1977 10.59 4 Kt 04.59 93 Kt 
4 7th of November 1968 
21 10th of August 1978 07.59 89 Kt 10.02 119 Kt 22 27th of September 1978 02.04 5 14th of October 1969 07.00 140 Kt 24 
44 Kt 
7 27th of September 1971 05.59 586 Kt 
18th of October 1979 07.09 70 Kt 
25 11th of October 1980 07.09 8 28th of August 1972 05.59 329 Kt 55 Kt (/2) 26 1st of October 1981 9 12th of September 1973 06.59 2 Mt 
12.14 113 Kt 
27 11th of October 1982 07.14 10-12 27th of October 1973 06.59 4 Mt (/3). 28 18th of August 1983 
44 Kt 
13 29th of August 1974 14.59 497 
16.09 89 Kt 
14 29 25th of September 1983 13.09 70 Kt 2nd of Novemberr 1974 04.59 2 Mt 30 25th of October 1984 15 23rd of August 1975 08.59 477 Kt 
06.29 89 Kt 
16 21st of October 1975 
31 2nd of August 1987 01.59 70 Kt 11.59 497 Kt 32 7th of May 1988 
18 
02.59 70 Kt 33 4th of December 1988 20th of October 1976 07.59 13 Kt 34 24th of October 1990 16.00 
Mt=megaton(s) Source: Soviet Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume IV. 
Kt=kiloton(s) 
Cited in: Nilsen and Bohmer, 124 
Thus 94 percent of the combined explosive force of Soviet nuclear detonations took place at 
Novaya Zemlya. It should be obvious that although there may have been fewer tests at Novaya 
Zemlya they were of a much greater magnitude and therefore a greater environmental threat. 
The Soviet Union has used two sites on Novaya Zemlya for nuclear testing. One at Chernaya 
Bay on the southern island, known as the southern field. The other by the Matotchin Straight on 
the northern island, known as the northern field .164 While the Soviets used both sites as testing 
areas for underground tests, they performed all of the 86 atmospheric tests at the northern test 
164 Nilsen and Bohmer, 122. Refer to Map 3.2 for a view of the two sites. 
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Map 3.2 
Northern and Southern Nuclear Test Sites at Novaya Zemlya 
Source: Nilsen and Bohmer, 122. 
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site. 165 The Soviets also performed three underwater tests in the Arctic: one in the Barents Sea in 
19 55; and two others off the coast of N ovaya Zemlya in 19 57 and 1961 . 166 Elevated levels of 
some radioactive elements in the lower sediments of the Barents Sea test site still present 
today167 are an excellent example of the longevity of nuclear waste in the environment. 
In August of 1963 the Soviet Union along with Great Britain and the United States signed the 
Moscow Treaty which banned test explosions in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater. 
The treaty became effective in October of 1963 .168 However, before the treaty came into effect 
the Soviet Union detonated the most powerful hydrogen bomb ever (58.5 megatons) above 
Novaya Zemlya in 1961 . 
The Big One 
The 1961 test at Novaya Zemlya was 3,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima 
explosion.169 It sent shock waves that shattered glass 700 krn away from the site.170 In fact the 
shock wave was so powerful that it went three times around the earth and the mushroom cloud 
extended almost 60 kilometers into the atmosphere.171 Scientists measured the resulting fallout 
165 Nilsen and Bohmer, 122. Peter Gizewski suggests the total of atmospheric tests is actually 
90. See: Gizewski, 17. 
166 Feshbach, Ecological Disaster ... , 43 . 
167 The main elements still found are cesium-137, plutonium-239 and plutonium-249. Nilsen and 
Bohmer, 127. 
168 Nilsen and Bohmer, 125 . 
169 Y ereth Rosen, "USSR Leaves Radioactive Legacy," Christian Science Monitor (26 August 
1992): 9. 
170 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, "Future ofNovaya Zemlya Test Site Viewed." ( 5 November 1991): 7, 
trans. in FBIS Daily Report, Central Eurasia, FBIS-SOV-91-216, (5 November 91) : 74. 
171 Nilsen and Bohmer, 124. 
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from the explosion over the entire northern hemisphere.172 Not only was the fallout a problem at 
the time but specialists believe that the combined fallout from all nuclear explosions at Novaya 
Zemlya will have medical, biological and genetic consequences for the next 5,600 years.173 
Underground Testing 
When the Soviet Union halted atmospheric and underwater testing it began to increase the 
number ofunderground test explosions. The main positive aspect of underground tests was that 
there was not supposed to be a release of radioactive gases into the atmosphere. 174 However, 
there are problems associated with underground testing as well. One problem is that underground 
explosions create significant earth movement. For example in September of 1970 the explosion of 
a one megaton bomb on the northern field created earth movements that traveled straight through 
the earth. Scientists registered the earth movement between New Zealand and the Antarctic as 
well as in Canada as it returned.175 This would seem to create obvious problems for the whole 
earth and there is really no way of knowing what kind of damage was made in performing such a 
test. There seemed to be an obvious concern about the use of such large tests underground since 
in July of 1974 the United States and the Soviet Union signed a treaty banning explosions with a 
force of more than 150 kilotons_l76 
Another problem associated with underground testing is the venting of radionuclides. There 
have been times when radioactive gases have leaked out from the ground due to seismic activity 
(or another nuclear test) and this continues to be a concern. In 1987 venting at Novaya Zemlya 
172 Ibid. 
173 Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 7 4. 
174 Nilsen and Bohmer, 125 . 
175 Ibid. , 126. 
176 Ibid., 127. 
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reportedly released the highest ever recorded amounts of radioactivity throughout Sweden, aside 
from the Chernobyl accident. 177 The venting was not an isolated incident: three years later a 
similar event occurred again. In addition to seismic activity the re-commencement of nuclear 
testing at N ovaya Zemlya would result in further venting, as it is estimated that every fifth 
underground test explosion in the Soviet Union has resulted in the venting of radioactive 
gases. 178 At present the possibility of venting presents the greatest threat from these past nuclear 
tests. Any large venting could be transported to the Canadian North and cause elevated levels of 
radioactivity in the area. 
In addition to nuclear testing for military purposes, the Soviet Union detonated 41 nuclear 
bombs for civil purposes. 179 The Soviet Union used nuclear explosions in the civil sector in the 
Arctic mainly in relation to mining. In addition to mining the Soviets used civil explosions in 
attempts to stop oil rig blow outs.180 Many of these practices were largely unsuccessful and only 
succeeded in increasing the amount of radioactive contamination in the Arctic. 
A main concern has been that Russia will recommence nuclear testing in the Arctic. Russia 
has not performed a test in the Arctic since 1990. However, the closure of the main test site at 
Semipalatinsk (and the fact that it is no longer located in Russia) has put increased pressure on 
using the Arctic for testing. Fortunately, there is now less of a concern since both the United 
States and Russia signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty on September 24, 1996.181 The 
177 Gizewski, 1 7. 
178 Nilsen and Bohmer, 127. 
179 Ibid 
180 Ibid , 129. 
181 Daily Highlights, http ://www.un.org/plweb_cgi/idoc.pl?323+unix+ _free_user_ +www.un. 
org .. 80+un+un+web+web++CTBT, September 24, 1996. 
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treaty prohibits nuclear explosions for either military or civil purposes. Hopefully both countries 
as well as others will continue to abide by the treaty in the future. 
Unfortunately, there are still strong pressures from military personnel to resume testing in both 
the United States and Russia.182 One of the arguments for resuming nuclear explosions at 
Novaya Zemlya suggests that the explosions could be used for dealing with nuclear and chemical 
waste. The idea is to bury large quantities of nuclear and chemical waste in a shaft a kilometer 
long and explode a nuclear device, which would fuse the waste and rock together.183 The main 
force behind the idea is that it is less expensive than conventional methods of dealing with high-
level nuclear wastes. The idea may become more appealing as there is less and less money to deal 
with the growing amount of radioactive waste discussed in Chapter Two. However, at the 
present time the risk associated with this type of a project remains too high. If the plan were to 
be put into action one could only image what kinds of problems would be associated with the 
combination of nuclear waste, chemical weapons and a nuclear explosion. Not only could nuclear 
contamination of the Arctic be a result, but chemical weapons fallout would also be a possibility. 
It is imperative that Western governments, including Canada, support and fund other means of 
disposing of nuclear waste in order to avoid the possible fallout from the application of such a 
plan. 
There is also a possibility that Russia will resume nuclear tests for military purposes. This 
threat is directly related to the domestic government in Russia. If hard-liners or old communists 
were to regain power in Russia, they could chose to resume testing again for security purposes. 
The resumption of testing would not only be a direct threat due to the radioactive fallout, but it 
would also increase the possibility of venting from past nuclear tests as well. It is for this reason 
182 Gizewski, 1 7. 
183 "Russians Plan Nuclear Explosions," Economist Newspaper Limited, London (3 March 1994): 
4. 
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that it is important not only to supply funds to help with the cleanup of the radioactive materials, 
but also to show political support for moderates in the Russian government. 
Effects of Nuclear Contamination 
The last chapter discussed the effects of nuclear contamination on health to help demonstrate the 
threat posed to northern Canadians from the dumping of nuclear waste and nuclear submarine 
accidents. These effects on health are the same as they would be for nuclear contamination 
spread through the atmosphere. The main difference is that when the radioactivity is transported 
through the air there is not as great a threat of acute radiation sickness, which would be the case 
in the transport of actual containers to the Canadian Arctic or a nuclear submarine accident in 
Canadian Arctic waters. However, other health problems associated with radioactivity are still a 
concern. For example the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) has estimated 
that bomb fallout in the Arctic will contribute to 750 cases of fatal cancer in the Arctic 
population.184 This number is an estimate; the actual effects of the radioactivity released by the 
numerous nuclear tests are hard to substantiate due to other factors that contribute to cancer 
rates. However, this does not dismiss the threat that nuclear contamination via air pollution 
poses. The contamination can endanger the lives of northern Canadians and thus requires action 
on the part of the Canadian government. 
NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
According to Andrei Y ablokov some accounts of former Soviet nuclear reactors suggest that they 
are 100-200 times more dangerous than those in the West. 185 Soviet reactors are thus much 
more likely to have accidents than Western reactors and therefore this work considers Soviet 
184 Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, Arctic Pollution Issues: A State of the Arctic 
Environment Report (Oslo: AMAP, 1997), 13 . Hereafter referred to as AMAP. 
185 Andrei Yablokov, "Notes on the Environmental Situation in Russia," Environmental Policy 
Review 16, no 2 (1992) : 6. 
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reactors to be security threats, while not suggesting that the same is necessarily true of all nuclear 
reactors. Any type of accident similar to the Chernobyl accident could result in significant 
radiological contamination ofthe Canadian North.186 As was noted in the previous section the 
air circulation in the Arctic moves from Northern Russia upwards into the Arctic and then south 
through North America. Thus, the potential for contamination from former Soviet reactors, 
particularly Russian reactors in the North, is a threat to the Canadian North and Northern 
Canadians. 
In 1986 one of the most famous nuclear accidents occurred within Reactor Four at Chernobyl 
in which an estimated 20,000 cleanup workers died and over 10 million people were affected.187 
The accident brought into question the use of nuclear energy not only in the former Soviet Union, 
but also around the world. Groups in opposition to nuclear energy have held up Chemobyl as the 
example of what can happen when dealing with nuclear power. The fact that the contamination 
spread so far and had such large effects on different populations demonstrates the threat posed by 
old Soviet reactors. Russian reports blamed the Chernobyl accident on the workers, but other 
reports (mainly Western) suggest that the real culprit was Socialist technology. 188 Since sixty-
two Soviet-designed power reactors still operate within the area of the former Soviet Union a 
threat still exists. Of the sixty-two reactors, fifteen are similar in design to the Chernobyl 
186 DIAND, Canadian Arctic ... , 157. 
187 "Chernobyl10 Years Later: Tragedy's Toll Mounts," Current Digest: Post Soviet Press 17, 
vol. 48 (1996) : 12; Anthony Tucker, "Once and Future Shock," Index on Censorship no.25 
(January/February 1996): 87. Refer to Map 3.3 for the directions in which the radioactivity from 
Chernobyl was carried. 
188 William E. Burrows, "Nuclear Chaos," Popular Science 245, no. 2 (August 1994): 56. 
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Map 3.3 
Direction of Radioactive Fallout from Chernobyl 
Source: Trafford and Wellborn, 19. 
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reactor and Western officials consider them to be very dangerous.189 The other forty-seven are 
pressurized water reactors called VVERs. They are more similar in design to the Western 
reactors, but lack real containment barriers and emergency core cooling systems.19° 
There is also a problem with inadequately trained workers at the Russian nuclear power plants. 
For example, in 1993 the chairman ofRussia's Atomic Industry Inspectorate reported 20,000 
safety violations. Furthermore nearly 10% of 5, 000 workers flunked a test on safety rules. 191 
These figures plus the age and design of the Russian reactors are a cause of concern in Canada 
and the United States. In particular there are two nuclear plants in the Russian Arctic that could 
prove to be the greatest threats due to their proximity to the Canadian North. The following 
discusses the Kola and Bilibino plants with respect to the threats they pose. 
Kola Plant 
The Kola Nuclear Power Plant is situated on the Kola Peninsula in the Northwestern Russia. The 
electric energy from this plant supplies local heavy industry as well as exporting energy to Karelia, 
St. Petersburg and Finland.192 The plant holds two VVER-440/230 type reactors and two 
VVER-440/213 type reactors. The main difference between the VVER-440 reactors and 
Western type reactors is the degree of safety containment surrounding the reactor tank. 193 The 
volume of the containment structure on the VVER-440/230 is too small to relieve any pressure 
arising from a breach which occurs in a pipe of more than 32 mrn in diameter. While the VVER-
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid, 56-57. 
192 An estimated 60% of the production went to local industry and the other 40% was exported. 
Nilsen and Bohmer, 108. 
193 Nilsen and Bohmer, 108. 
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440/213 is an improved version of the 23 0 model, it is still not on par with Western style 
reactors.194 This is a concern due to the large number of accidents that take place at the Kola 
plant. For a list of the more serious accidents at the Kola plant from 1991 to 1994 please refer to 
Table 3.3 below. 
TABLE 3.3 
List of Accidents from 1991 to 1994 at Kola Plant195 
September 12, 1991 Leakage of radioactive water at Kola nuclear power plant 
December 7, 1991 Failure of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant 
December 11, 1991 Human error causes failure of automatic reactor shut-down equipment at 
December 16, 1991 
January 19, 1992 
March 9, 1992 
April 16, 1992 
April 18, 1992 
May 16, 1992 
June 8, 1992 
February 2, 1993 
May 27, 1993 
March 2, 1994 
194 Ibid 
Kola nuclear power plant 
Technical failure at Kola nuclear power plant 
Radioactive leak, reactor shut-down at Kola nuclear power plant 
Fire at Kola nuclear power plant 
Technical failure of reactor shut-down system at Kola nuclear power plant 
Technical failure during refueling at Kola nuclear power plant 
Reactor shut-down at Kola nuclear power plant 
Failure of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant 
Breakdown of cooling system for two hours at Kola nuclear power plant 
Reactor shut-down due to breakdown of cooling system at Kola nuclear 
power plant 
Breakdown of cooling system at Kola nuclear power plant 
195 These accident were taken out from a list of nuclear accidents on this site. http://www. 
greenpeace. org/ ~comms/nukes/ chernob/rep02. htrnl 
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During 1992 there were actually 39 incidences at the Kola plant and in February of 1993 the 
oldest reactor was but short time away from a melt-down.196 The potential for future accidents 
and even a melt down seem to be fairly high. This potential is demonstrated even more when, for 
example, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) discovered 1,300 items relating to 
safety at the Kola Plant during inspections. In fact the IAEA has estimated the chance of a 
meltdown in the two oldest reactors at the Kola Plant as 25% over 23 years.197 Since the two 
reactors have been in operation for 20 and 21 years and are planned to stay in operation until 
2002 and 2003 , the potential for a meltdown is real. When the Bellona Foundation performed an 
inspection of the reactor rooms, it found several problems as well as a general disorder. Included 
in the disorder were loose cables and wires, radioactively contaminated equipment in a corner of 
the hall separated by a string, warning lamps for elevated radiation levels that were constantly on 
and little fire extinguishing equipment. 198 In addition to the lack of fire extinguishing equipment 
(sometimes only shovels and rusty buckets) officials allow smoking in the control rooms and the 
reactor halls. All of this combines to make the potential for a serious accident very high. 
Furthermore, a lack of funds means that it is difficult to address the situation. 
In the case of a serious accident at the plant the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research Programme 
has determined that the " ... present technical and protection devices are not adequate to retain the 
radioactive products inside the plant. "199 Western officials suggest that the best solution is the 
implementation of Western style reactors and equipment, since it has been agreed that it is 
virtually impossible to upgrade the plant to Western safety standards. 200 Others would suggest 
196 Ibid , 110. 
197 Ibid , 111. 
198 Nilsen and Bohmer, 112. 
199 AMAP 124 , . 
200 Ibid , 110. 
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that nuclear energy itself is the problem and that safer more environmentally friendly methods of 
generating power need to be found . However, at this point in time the power that these plants 
supply is very necessary and has no substitute. Thus it is even more difficult for Russia to address 
the situation at all . 
Bilibino Plant 
The proximity of the Bilibino plant in Chukotka (in northeastern Russia) makes it the most 
threatening to the Canadian North. Dan Jaffe has shown, through the use of wind direction 
models, that a nuclear accident at Bilibino would impact Alaska, and shortly thereafter Canada, in 
four days. 201 While the plant is smaller and may not have as great of a potential release as other 
plants its proximity makes it more threatening. With this said other larger plants such as the Kola 
are also in close proximity to the Arctic and could release large amounts of radioactivity. 
The Bilibino nuclear plant is a small 44 MW nuclear power station that Soviet officials opened 
in February of 197 5 in order to supply energy to the Magadan region. 202 It has not been plagued 
with the same number of problems as the Kola plant. Even though it is not as accident prone as 
the Kola plant it is still a concern for the Canadian North due to its proximity. Furthermore it has 
not been completely accident free . In 1991 the plant had two serious accidents. One involved the 
leakage of radiation, the other, a malfunction of the automatic shut-down system. 203 More 
recently officials had to shut the plant down due to a crack in the cooling system in March of 
1996 _2°4 This recent accident has caused a great deal of concern in North America about the 
201 Murray Feshbach, "Environmental and Health Problems in the Former Soviet Union: Do They 
Matter to the United States?" Environmental Change and Security Project Report, no. 3 (Spring 
1997): 181-182. 
202 http ://www.iaea.or.at/programmes/a2/reactors.html 
203 http ://www. greenpeace.org/-comms/nukes/chernob/rep02.html 
204 "Nuclear Plant Shut Down in Russian Far East," http://www.newstimes.com/archive/ 
mar0596/ing.htm, March 5, 1996. 
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possibility of future accidents. 205 Since the plant is not scheduled for decommissioning until 
between 2004 and 2006 an even greater concern exists for the future. 
Effects of Nuclear Contamination 
The effects of radioactivity on the health of humans is varied and differs with the dosage received. 
For example fire fighters at Chernobyl during the accident and residents ofHiroshima and 
Nagasaki in 1945 received a high level of exposure that in many cases led to radiation sickness 
and death. 206 In areas receiving fallout there were also increases in cancer and death rates among 
their populations. Contaminated areas of Belarus, from the Chernobyl accident, saw the incidence 
of cancer of the thyroid gland among children rise to 50 times what uncontaminated areas 
were. 207 Furthermore, the most contaminated areas of the Bryansk Province in Russia saw a 200 
percent increase in the number of children born with convulsive syndrome and a 120 percent 
increase in the number of children with delayed mental and speech development. 208 
While these areas were in close proximity to the accident other areas should also be concerned 
about the health effects on their population for accidents of this kind. For example northern parts 
of Scandinavia were also adversely affected by the Chernobyl accident. The greatest threat to the 
Canadian Arctic comes from the Bilibino plant due to its proximity. The Kola Plant also poses a 
threat since it is larger and still located in the Arctic region. 
205 http ://www.ra.anl.gov/INSP/neisb/NEISB _3 . l .html 
206 AMAP 112 ' . 
207 "Chernobyl10 Years Later: ... ", 12 
208 Ibid 13 ., . 
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OTHER TYPES OF ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION IN THE ARCTIC 
While POPs are transported through air as well as water, they will not be addressed here since 
they were addressed in the last chapter and most of what was said with respect to the type of 
threat they pose is the same for their transport via the atmosphere. Simply as a demonstration of 
this, Murray Feshbach points out that environmental pollution of the land and atmosphere by 
DDT, PCBs and dioxin in Russia is mostly a local problem and that it does not pose an 
"immediate ecological threat to Europe or nearby Asian countries. "209 Thus the following will 
only examine the atmospheric pollution of the North from heavy metals, sulfur and nitrogen. 
Heavy Metals 
A great deal of the heavy metals found in the air in the Arctic originates from Eurasia. Scientists 
see Russian sources as relatively important to the Arctic due to their location in the far north and 
the air pressure system which drives the pollution north in the winter. 210 However, while 
emissions of heavy metals from the Urals and Norilsk contaminate the air over Alaska and Arctic 
Canada, emissions from North America contaminate the Subarctic areas of northern Canada.211 
Thus, emissions of heavy metals in the North have more than one main source, while radioactive 
contamination has the greatest potential of originating from one source (Russia). There are 
however, areas in which heavy metals have caused a threat to local populations. For example on 
the Kola Peninsula and in the Norilsk region of Russia local smelters have severely damaged the 
soil and ground vegetation in the areas surrounding the smelters.212 The main concern with the 
smelters is local since most of the smelter emissions are deposited very close to their source. 
Since some of the worst polluting plants are near the Norwegian border this does also pose a 
threat to the area of Scandinavia. 
209 F eshbach "Environmental " 181 ' ... , . 
210 AMAP 98 ' . 
211 Ibid. 
212 Ibid 109 ., . 
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While local areas around the northern Russian smelters have cause for concern for the 
public's health, the heavy metals emitted from the smelters alone can not be seen as a security 
threat for Canada. On a global scale the heavy metal emissions may be a source of concern in 
terms of global security, but it is difficult to address as a national security issue due to the fact that 
most countries have releases of heavy metals. Further illustrating this is the fact that the most 
concern caused by heavy metals is from cadmium and mercury, neither ofwhich cannot be 
attributed to any one main source: thus the effort to address the heavy metal threat may be better 
suited to a more global perspective. 
Arctic Haze and Acidification 
The phenomenon known as arctic haze has become a concern for many of the arctic countries. 
The main source of the haze appears to be industrial effiuents (mostly sulfur and nitrogen), 
aerosols and gases from Eurasia and North America. 213 The sulfur and nitrogen together with 
the aerosols, over time transform into particles of sulfuric and nitric acids, which are similar to 
acid rain and cause a haze to appear in the Arctic, effectively reducing visibility and causing 
concern for possible health effects.214 At present the concentrations of pollutants are 
comparatively small, but there is a concern for their long-term accumulation in the food chain.215 
Scientists have made a connection between the Eurasian sulfur and nitrogen emissions and 
elevated levels of their oxides in the Canadian Arctic air, as well as the Arctic as a whole.216 
213 J. G. Roederer, "Understanding the Arctic: Research Policies and Responsibilities," in 
Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1991): 3; J. M. Pacyna, "Chemical Tracers of the Origins of Arctic Air Pollution," in 
Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York: Elsevier Science 
Publishers, 1991): 99. 
214 Pacyna, 99; David Phillips, "Long-distance Pollution Soils Our Arctic," Canadian Geographic 
115, no 3 (June 1995): 25 . 
215 Roederer, 3. 
216 L. A Barrie and J. W. Bottenheim, "Sulphur and Nitrogen Pollution in the Arctic 
Atmosphere," in Pollution of the Arctic Atmosphere, edited by W. T. Sturges, (New York: 
Elsevier Science Publishers, 1991): 179. 
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However, North American emissions of sulfur and nitrogen create enhanced levels in the air and 
precipitation ofNorth Atlantic air entering Europe.217 So while Canada receives pollution from 
Eurasia it in turn emits pollutants that pollute Eurasia. Thus, the reason that North American 
emissions are not contributing to Arctic haze as much as Eurasia is simply due to the fact that the 
prevailing winds carry North American pollution east as opposed to North.218 For this reason, 
the problem of sulfur and nitrogen pollution appears to be more of a global threat than an isolated 
threat. 
It is still necessary to examine some of the more serious polluters in the Russian North and 
assess the threat they pose to the Arctic specifically. The two main areas that need to be 
examined are the Kola Peninsula and Norilsk, which both contribute to the presence of nitrogen 
and sulfur in the Arctic atmosphere. 
Kola Peninsula and Norilsk 
The Kola peninsula is a source of large amounts of sulfur emissions. Sulfur dioxide emissions 
from the Kola are around 700,000 tons, which is twice as great as those from all ofFinland.219 
These massive amounts of emissions have created a type of industrial desert, covering an area of 
100,000 hectares, in which there are practically no living plants.220 In addition to this an area of 
about 5 million hectares has experienced tree defoliation and changes in the composition oflichen 
217 Barrie and Bottenheim, 179. 
218 Phillips, 25 . 
21 9 D. J. Peterson, Troubled Lands, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993): 41 ; Alex Yu. Roginko, 
"Environmental Issues in the Soviet Arctic and the Fate of Northern Natives," in The Soviet 
Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics, edited by John Massey Stewart (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 215 . 
220 Roginko, "Environmental Issues ... ," 215 . 
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and moss species.221 The health consequences stemming from the sulfur emissions are that up to 
60 percent of the local population suffers from respiratory and other environment-connected 
diseases. 222 
Another large emitter of pollution in the Russian North is the nickel production at Norilsk, 
which emits about 2.5 million tonnes of sulfur dioxide a year (almost the same as the amount for 
the whole of Camida). 223 Norilsk is the single greatest source of atmospheric sulfur emissions in 
the world.224 The result has been a sky that is perpetually stained yellow, the destruction of2.6 
million hectares of surrounding tundra, a high rate of respiratory and other diseases, and an infant 
mortality rate that exceeds the already high Russian average by 20 to 3 0 percent. 225 
Furthermore, attempts to transplant coniferous trees in the city have ended in failure due to the 
large amounts of pollution. 226 Obviously there have been significant effects on local areas, but 
the Arctic as a whole or the Canadian Arctic is not directly threatened by these emissions. This 
however, is not the case for Scandinavia. 
Due to the proximity of the Finnish-Russian border large amounts of air pollution cross over 
into Finland and other parts of Scandinavia from the heavy metal industry on the Kola Peninsula. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Ibid. 
223 John Massey Stewart, "Air and Water Problems Beyond the Urals," in The Soviet 
Environment: Problems, Policies and Politics, edited by John Massey Stewart (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992): 226; Alan Saunders, "Poisoning the Arctic Skies," Arctic 
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One Finnish diplomat suggested that the pollution from the Kola peninsula has reduced the forest 
in parts ofLapland to a lunar landscape.227 Finland is not the only Scandinavian country that is 
concerned about the extent ofthe pollution, Norway has also been an active participant in the 
effort to reduce emissions from industries in the Russian North. Since the late 1980s the 
Norwegian government actively pressed for an intergovernmental agreement on pollution control, 
due to the risk posed to its northern population from the Russian industries. 228 The result is that 
on March 26, 1996 Norway and Russia signed an accord in which Norway will provide $47 
million towards the reconstruction of the Nikel smelter on the Kola peninsula. Norwegian 
officials have estimated the total cost of the project at $280 million; the additional funds will be 
supplied from the Russian Federation and from revenues derived from the exemption of customs 
duties on nickel exports from the Kola.229 The Norwegian government's actions demonstrate 
that for Norway the problems associated with the pollution emanating from northern Russian 
industry was a serious source of concern, so much so that it negotiated a bilateral arrangement in 
order to address the situation. For Norway the situation was seen as a national security issue, in 
that the emissions were affecting not only the wildlife and land but also the health of the 
Norwegian residents. The Norwegian government thus chose to act on the issue in order to help 
protect its population. 
Are Northern Russian Industries a Threat to Canada? 
There are a number of reasons why this chapter views air pollution by heavy metals, nitrogen and 
sulfur in the Russian North not to be national security threats to Canada. While there is proof that 
Russian sources do contribute substantially to the problem of Arctic haze, evidence also exists 
that other substantial sources contribute to high levels of sulfur dioxide in the Arctic during the 
227 Peterson, 41 . 
228 Bond, 307. 
229 Ibid. 
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winter months. 230 North American emissions cannot be forgotten simply because they do not 
generally blow directly into the Arctic but rather flow towards Europe. In fact even the Kola 
Peninsula is a victim of sulfur dioxide emissions from Europe. 231 Furthermore, the health effects 
of Arctic haze are questionable since the sulfur compounds are much lower than those found in 
heavily polluted cities, and the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme suggests that "due 
to low deposition rates, the haze causes neither adverse effects on plants and animals, nor direct 
health problems in people. "232 The cases in which adverse effects on plants, animals and people 
are felt is in areas that are in close proximity to the source of the pollutants. Northern 
Scandinavia, for example, has experienced some serious problems due to its proximity to the large 
smelters on the Kola peninsula. 233 The truth is that the overall average amount of emissions of 
acid rain precipitators in Russia in no higher than in many Western European nations. The 
problem is that many specific plants and areas are large polluters causing problems in the local 
areas surrounding them. 234 In general the sulfur deposition in northern Canada is low compared 
to regions of northern Russia and emissions seem to have only a moderate influence on 
precipitation in areas farther than 20-50 kilometers from the smelters. 235 Thus, emissions of 
heavy metals and the phenomenon of arctic haze are really more global issues, while the extreme 
pollution emanating from industries in the Russian North may be security threats for Scandinavia, 
but not Canada. 
230 In fact a 1997 report from the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme suggested that 
most of the sulfur in Arctic air comes from industrial areas further south. Specifically, Eurasia 
contributes approximately 40 percent, eastern North America 20 percent and a large part of the 
remaining global emissions occur in the Far East, particularly China. AMAP, 130-133 . 
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CONCLUSION 
The most immediate threat to the Canadian Arctic from the air transport of pollutants seems to 
come from the aging and poorly designed Soviet nuclear power plant reactors in the Arctic. The 
threat poses a concern for all of Canada in that air circulation could transport radioactivity from 
an accident in the Russian North to first the Canadian Arctic and then farther south. While the 
greatest effects stemming from an accident would be in the area directly surrounding the plant, 
there could be adverse effects, such as increased cancer rates, on the health of northern 
Canadians. 
Nuclear testing is also a threat that has the possibility of affecting southern as well as northern 
Canadians. It was a large source of contamination in the past and will hopefully not be a major 
threat in the future, ifRussia remains a signatory of the CTBT. However, there is still the threat 
ofventing from past underground tests due to seismic activity. It is not however, seen as 
immediate a threat as the nuclear power plants. 
Whether it is via marine or atmospheric transport nuclear contamination of the Russian North 
is a real threat to Canada. The fact remains that : 
A large number of radioactive sources are present in the Arctic: storage 
of spent nuclear fuel, decommissioned nuclear submarines, nuclear reactors 
on land and on board ships, and contained sources in the environment. This 
concentration of potential sources and risks for releases cause concern, 
especially together with the fact that the uptake and transfer of radionuclides, 
and thereby the potential exposure of people and biota, is much higher in the 
Arctic terrestrial environment than other areas. 236 
The possible consequences of nuclear contamination call for it to be identified as a national 
security threat and addressed as a national security threat. Since the source of the nuclear 
contamination is clear and singular, it is easier to address as a national security threat than as a 
236 Ibid 127 ., . 
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global threat. Other issues such as POPs, global warming and ozone depletion are not easily or 
effectively addressed at national levels and thus need a more global action. However, nuclear 
contamination in the Arctic is derived from one main source and affects relatively few countries 
directly. It is advisable for the Arctic countries to cooperate in addressing this issue much as they 
would have to address a military issue. The differences are that military action is not required and 
the country from which the threat is emanating is also a necessary and welcome participant in this 
cooperation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The previous two chapters argued that the radioactive contamination of the environment in the 
Russian North is a national security threat to Canada. This thesis now turns to an examination of 
Canadian foreign policy to determine how Canada is and is not addressing the environmental 
threat from Russia as a national security threat, both in policy statements and in actions. While 
Canadian policy directly acknowledges the threat posed by aging nuclear power plants in Russia, 
it has not identified or addressed the threats posed by nuclear submarines, nuclear waste and 
nuclear testing. This chapter argues that one of the main reasons the Canadian government does 
not adequately address many of these threats is because it does not distinguish between global and 
national environmental threats. 
The chapter starts by examining the context in which Canadian foreign policy towards Russia 
has been allowed to evolve due to the changes in the international setting. More specifically the 
first section examines how the end of the Cold War caused a greater openness in the Russian 
Federation, which in turn has allowed greater cooperation concerning all issues, including the 
environment. The chapter then examines the Canadian responses -- policy statements and actions 
-- to the nuclear threats. The analysis focuses on both bilateral and multilateral responses and 
assesses whether or not they properly identify and address existing threats. An important 
criterion of this assessment is to see if the responses reduce the threat posed to the well-being of 
Canada. 
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL THREATS: A COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOUR 
The radical changes that occurred in the period leading to the collapse of the Former Soviet 
Union (FSU) and the end of the Cold War were fortuitous not only for redefining security to 
include the environment, but also for the opportunity to be able to address these new threats 
through cooperation. One cannot overstate the importance of this new era of cooperation, since 
the ability to cooperate with the country from which an environmental threat originates is key to 
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addressing that threat. It is important to keep this in mind in the following discussion of the 
changes not only in Canadian foreign policy, but also in Russian foreign policy. 
The cooperation that we now witness on environmental issues between Russia and the West 
was not possible during the Cold War. 237 Due to their shared interests in the Arctic, Canada did 
seek a special bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union in the 1970s, but the hostilities of the 
Cold War made this goal unattainable. Not only were relations between the two countries 
restricted in the past, but also no state placed environmental concerns at the top of its priority list. 
The lack of concern over environmental issues was an additional obstacle to overcome in terms of 
cooperation on the issue of environmental security. 
In Russia the policies of perestroika and glasnost began to change attitudes on both 
cooperation and the environment. On October 1, 1987, then Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
made a speech in Murmansk which signaled a radical departure from past environmental and 
foreign policies. In his speech Gorbachev specifically addressed environmental degradation and 
the need for countries to cooperate in order to deal with this growing problem: 
We attach special importance to the co-operation of the northern countries 
in environmental protection. The urgency of this is obvious. It would be well 
to extend joint measures for protection of the marine environment of the Baltic, 
now being carried out by a commission of seven maritime states, to the entire 
oceanic and sea surface of the globe's North. The Soviet Union proposes 
drawing up jointly an integrated comprehensive plan for protecting the natural 
environment of the North. The North European countries could set an example 
to others by reaching an agreement on establishing a system to monitor the 
state of the natural environment and radiation safety in the region ... . 238 
237 John M. Lamb, 11 Canadian Relations with the New Russia: Security Concerns and Policy 
Responses, 11 Canadian Foreign Policy 2, no.1 (Spring 1994): 79. 
238 Mikhail Gorbachev, address in Murmansk, October 1, 1987. In Foreign Broadcast 
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Committee, 1991), 55 . Hereafter referred to as CARC. 
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Gorbachev's speech reflected a much more open foreign policy than what existed during the Cold 
War. Alexei Yu. Roginko views the Murmansk initiatives as the turning point in Soviet Arctic 
policies. He suggests that the most striking feature of these initiatives was " ... that they 
represented an authoritative exposition of a unified approach to Arctic policy by the Soviet 
Union, bringing together security, resources, scientific and environmental issues." 239 The proof 
that the Murmansk speech was more than simple rhetoric stems from the fact that since the 
speech participation in environmental concerns by Russia has greatly increased and Russia has 
given the Arctic one of the highest priorities in Russian foreign policy.240 The result is that 
Canada and other states are now in a position to cooperate with Russia on issues of 
environmental degradation. Since the collapse ofthe Soviet Union in 1991, there has been an 
even greater acceleration in the growth of relations with Russia. 241 
While Russia is more open and willing to cooperate, the transition to a market economy means 
that the Russian state continues to sacrifice the environment in order meet the everyday needs of 
the Russian people. With an economy strapped for hard currency, fossil fuels in the Russian 
Arctic continue to be an important resource. Russian officials have given the Arctic and its 
resources a high priority in an attempt to maximize income from oil and gas exports in this 
area. 242 The new problem that exists is the conflict between building a new economy and 
protecting an environment under pressure. At the present time the primary goals of the Russian 
government are to meet the daily living needs of Russians and to achieve economic stability.243 
239 Alexei Yu. Roginko, The NSR in the context of Arctic Military and Ecological 
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Unfortunately this means that environmental issues are of a secondary concern for the Russian 
government. The duality of change in Russia means two things: one, cooperation with Russia on 
environmental concerns is possible; two, Russia needs cooperation from other states in terms of 
funding to help address environmental concerns. 
WHAT HAS THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SAID ABOUT ENVIRONMENTAL 
THREATS FROM RUSSIA? 
Increasingly the Canadian government accepts that environmental degradation is a security threat. 
Its increasing acknowledgment, however, is flawed in two ways. First, the Canadian government 
takes a blanket approach to environmental issues which does not distinguish between national and 
global security threats. Second, the Canadian government does not distinguish between serious 
environmental threats and environmental concerns. The conflation of all environmental issues 
mixes environmental security threats with other less serious environmental issues and thus makes 
it more difficult to properly address the actual threats to security. However, the Canadian 
government does treat one area -- nuclear power plant safety -- specifically as a national security 
threat. 
Environmental Concerns vs Environmental Threats 
Many of the Canadian policy statements with respect to environmental degradation conflate 
serious environmental threats with all environmental issues. The Canadian Arctic Environmental 
Strategy (AES) is the main document addressing the Canadian government's policy with regards 
to the Arctic environment and its contents demonstrate this problem of identification. For 
example the goal of the AES is to "preserve and enhance the integrity, health, bio-diversity and 
productivity of our Arctic ecosystems for the benefit of present and future generations. "244 This 
Stewart, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 209. 
244 Nigel Bankes, Terry Fenge and Sarah Kalff, "Toward Sustainable Development: Policies and 
International Relations," in Canada Among Nations 1993-94 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
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is a very broad and general statement which demonstrates that the Canadian government fails to 
make the distinction between environmental threats and environmental concerns. The following 
five main objectives of the AES further illustrate this problem: 
1. To ensure the health and well-being of Arctic ecosystems; 
2. To provide for the protection and enhancement of environmental quality and sustainable 
utilization of resources, including their use by indigenous peoples; 
3. To ensure that indigenous peoples' perspectives, values and practices are fully 
accommodated in the planning, development, conservation and protection of the Arctic 
reg1on; 
4 . To ensure better decision-making through integration of local, national and 
international interests as part of new legal, constitutional and co-operative 
arrangements; and 
5. To develop international agreements and arrangements to use, conserve and manage 
resources and protect the circumpolar Arctic environment. 245 
While the identification of the environment (in the AES objectives) as an important part of 
ensuring the "health and well-being of the Arctic ecosystems" demonstrates the partial acceptance 
by the Canadian government of identifying environmental degradation as a security threat there is 
no real identification of national environmental security threats. Why, for example, is there no 
objective that has as its main goal the implementation of an environmental security program that 
assesses environmental threats for their security implications and finds ways in which to address 
these threats? 
Even when Canadian policy identifies a threat, it still uses labeling that does not differentiate 
between serious threats and other environmental degradation in general. For example the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has recognized that environmental 
degradation in Russia is a "direct threat to Canadian well-being. "246 This statement suggests that 
Year), 17 5; Canada. Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, The Arctic Environmental 
Strategy An Action P /an (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1991 ), 2. Hereafter referred 
to as DIAND, The Arctic Environmental. .. 
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Years of Progress (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, 1996), 6. 
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all environmental degradation in Russia is a threat to Canadian security when what it should be 
suggesting is that there are specific problems of environmental degradation that are security 
threats to Canada, while others are not. The difference may seem slight, but actually is important 
since the identification of specific threats means that there is a clearly defined problem for which 
the Canadian government has to find a solution, as opposed to a general statement which can be 
addressed through a general, but not too involved, policy. 
To some extent the Canadian government did acknowledge the significance of environmental 
threats by placing them in the 1994 White Paper. The following quotation from the 1994 White 
Paper discusses the role played by the Department ofNational Defence with respect to 
environmental threats : 
The Department ofNational Defence has concluded a memorandum of 
understanding with the Department of the Environment with respect to the 
use of the Canadian Forces in environmental surveillance and clean-up. The 
agreement sets out the role of the Department and the Forces in assisting the 
Department of the Environment in the event of a serious environmental 
incident. In addition, as the Forces carry out their routine surveillance mission, 
they will seek to identify and report potential and actual environmental 
problems. "24 7 
While the report does identify that a role exists for the DND with respect to the environment it 
really only addresses responses to catastrophes that have already happened as opposed to 
addressing present threats in order to avert a catastrophe. Furthermore there is no direct 
identification of environmental threats as security threats. In contrast to this the American 
government has done a better job in terms of identifying that environmental threats do exist. For 
example, the White House issued a National Security Strategy paper which acknowledged that 
environmental concerns should be included in the national security agenda: 
Cooperation with Russia (Project Listing as of February 28, 1997), 6. Hereafter referred to as 
CIDA. 
247 Canada. Department ofNational Defence, 17-18. 
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Our engagement must be selective, focusing on the challenges that are most 
relevant to our own interests and focusing our resources where we can make 
the most difference .. .In all cases, the nature of our response must depend on 
what best serves our own long-term interests. Those interests are ultimately 
defined by our security requirements. Such requirements start with our physical 
defense and economic well-being. They also include environmental security as 
well as the security of values achieved through the expansion of the community 
of democratic nations. 248 
The above quotation not only demonstrates the acceptance of environmental security, but also 
confirms that the environment is an integral part of American national security. While the 
Canadian government has identified environmental problems as a concern, it has usually done this 
in terms of global issues and has not directly identified that there is a need to address 
environmental threats that threaten national security. 
Global vs National Security Threats 
In addition to conflating environmental threats and environmental concerns, Canadian policy also 
conflates national and global environmental threats. In most cases global threats like POPs and 
national threats like nuclear waste are included in the same category. For example the AES does 
not have an objective that acknowledges the importance of distinguishing between national and 
global threats. 249 Furthermore, most of the programs that Canada is involved in, for example the 
Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program (AMAP) do not differentiate between global and 
national threats. 
National Security: Finally Getting it Right 
The one area in which the Canadian government comes the closest to actually identifying an 
environmental threat as a national security threat is with the threat posed by nuclear reactors in 
Russia. In 1991 the Canadian technical assistance program for the FSU identified that the safety 
248 United States, National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, 
D.C. : The White House, 1995), 1 and 7, cited in Griffiths, 17. 
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ofRussian nuclear power plants is a security concern for Canada. In this program the Canadian 
government has placed the threat posed by Russian nuclear power plants under the specific sector 
of security. 250 By placing the threat from aging plants under the sector of security the Canadian 
government has been able to give it greater attention and funding . This is also the area where 
disastrous consequences have already been faced as a result of not addressing the threat soon 
enough. The Chernobyl accident and its fallout made the safety ofRussian nuclear plants a 
readily acknowledged security threat because the results of an accident have actually been 
witnessed and deemed to be horrific. The identification of nuclear power plants as a security 
concern has meant that this threat has received a great deal more attention by the Canadian 
government than other environmental security areas. 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO THE NUCLEAR AND NON-
NUCLEAR THREATS 
To address national security threats, states often employ the instruments ofbilateral and 
multilateral agreements. For example the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) are bilateral and multilateral responses 
to the former military threat posed by the USSR In a similar fashion the Canadian government 
uses bilateral and multilateral agreements to deal with environmental issues. The Canadian 
government has entered into several broad bilateral agreements with Russia, which include 
environmental cooperation, technical support, technical exchanges and financial support, in order 
to address the environmental threat to the Arctic. 251 In addition to this the Canadian government 
250 Lamb 81 ' . 
251 Report to Ministers AMAP Interim Report to the Third Ministerial Conference, Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy, Inuvik, Canada, By the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
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98 
has entered into several multilateral agreements that address environmental degradation in the 
Arctic. 
TABLE 4.1 
Bilateral Agreements Between Russia and Canada Pertaining to the Environment 
April 16, 1984 -- Protocol of Canadian-Soviet Consultations on the Development of a 
Programme of Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Arctic and the North 252 
April20, 1988 -- Protocol on Problems ofMonitoring and Environmental Protection with the 
USSR 253 
November 20, 1989 -- General Agreement on Arctic Cooperation with the Soviet Union 254 
June 19, 1992 -- Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Russian Federation on Cooperation in the Arctic and the North 255 (replaced 1989 Agreement) 
June 19, 1992 -- Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between Canada and the Russian 
Federation 256 
1993 -- Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Russia 
Federation concerning Environmental Cooperation 257 
The bilateral and multilateral agreements are important cooperative attempts to address the 
problems with the Arctic environment. Not surprisingly, however, given the Canadian policy 
252 CARC, 52. 
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256 Canadian Government, Treaty on Concord and Cooperation between CANADA and the 
RUSSIAN FEDERATION Treaty Series 1993, no. 23 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1994), 10. 
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statements, these agreements fail to distinguish between global and national environmental threats 
and actually refer to environmental protection as one large overlapping objective. 
Marine Pollution From Nuclear Waste 
For the most part the Canadian government has failed to properly address the threat posed from 
nuclear waste because it does not directly identify that the threat exists. The Canadian Nuclear 
Safety Initiative (CNSI) is supposed to include nuclear waste concerns, but really only 
concentrates on the safety of nuclear power plants. The only other agreements Canada is 
involved with concerning the monitoring of radioactive dumping are found in the Arctic 
Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS), the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Program 
(AMAP) and the Arctic Council. 258 These agreements involve the participation of all eight Arctic 
countries and provide an opportunity for these countries to work together in dealing with 
environmental problems in the Arctic. 
Under the AEPS and AMAP, Canada has been a participant in an ongoing assessment of the 
extent of radioactive contamination and the potential risks. 259 In 1995 AMAP opened a Data 
Centre which monitors the type and levels of radioactive contamination in the atmosphere and the 
258 Canada. Department oflndian Affairs and Northern Development, "Environment and 
Renewable Resources: Cooperation with Russia concerning Circumpolar Environmental 
Problems," in report given at An Information Sharing Workshop on Canadian Technical 
assistance and the Russian Environment Sector on April13, 1993; The AEPS was signed in June 
of 1991 in Rovaniemi, Finland and is also know as the Rovaniemi Initiative. Lassi Heininen, "An 
Introduction," Arctic Environmental Problems, Lassi Heininen, 2nd ed. (Tampere: Tampere 
Peace Research Institute, 1990) 16; CARC, 57; Bankes et. al., 177; AMAP is a part ofthe 
accomplishments the AEPS it was also initiated in 1991 and the first phase of AMAP was devoted 
to establishing a monitoring program for the Arctic. AMAP 96: 1, 21 ; The Arctic Council was 
established in September of 1996 in order to facilitate co-operation in protecting the Arctic 
environment. Arctic Council, Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Counci/1996, 1; 
Arctic Council, 1. See also "Canada and the Arctic Council," Global Agenda 4, no.3 (December 
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ocean. 260 While this is definitely a step forward in terms of monitoring the radioactive 
contamination there have been little gains made in the actual clean-up of the waste. Furthermore, 
the problem with AMAP is that it spreads its resources too thin by dealing with a broad range of 
issues including its priorities of persistent organic pollutants (POPs), certain heavy metals and 
radionuclides. 261 
This also is a good example of how a global threat like POPs has been lumped together with 
the more national threat of radionuclides. The problem with doing this is that by addressing POPs 
through AMAP some progress may be made, but the problem will not be adequately dealt with 
because it is a global threat. On the other hand AMAP would be a good forum for addressing the 
issue of radionuclides in the North, because the main threat of radioactive contamination 
originates from one ofthe Arctic states (Russia) . 
There are other possible ways through which the Canadian government could address the 
threat posed by nuclear waste from Russia. One option for addressing the threat, after it has been 
identified as one, would be for the Canadian government to create a new section for the CNSI 
that specifically deals with the nuclear waste threat. John M. Lamb suggests that this is one of the 
solutions that Canada could use to improve the safety of nuclear storage facilities in Russia. 262 
Another option would be for Canada to seek greater involvement with the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council's initiatives in the cleanup of the nuclear waste threat. The Council is one multilateral 
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agreement that specifically addresses the threat posed by nuclear waste in the Arctic. The 
priorities ofthe Council are nuclear safety, decommissioning of nuclear submarines, handling and 
transport of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, and the storage of radioactive waste and 
spent nuclear fuel. 263 Further to this the Council has even made recommendations concerning 
radioactive pollution in the Arctic and supports the establishment of an IAEA contact expert 
group to deal with the management and storage of radioactive waste and spent fuel. 264 In 
addition to this the Council has acknowledged that Russia, alone, is not able to deal with the 
elimination of the effects of nuclear dumping in the Arctic and thus it is necessary for other states 
to aid Russia in addressing these nuclear threats. 265 The Council has shown, by far, the most 
concern and understanding, among all international organizations, towards the threat of nuclear 
contamination in the Arctic. Roginko suggests that the Council: 
... represents the first authoritative international forum that operates 
in the most politically and environmentally sensitive region of the Arctic. 
Since the mandate of the Council includes comprehensive coverage of the 
issues of both environmental security and navigation along the NSR, its 
activities may become most instrumental, particularly in providing institutional 
and financial bases for effecting changes in the economic and other activities 
which threaten the environmental security of the Arctic. 266 
Given the Council's focus on nuclear contamination, it is surprising that the Canadian government 
has not been a more active member of the Council. Although Canada has observer status on the 
Council it should pursue a more proactive role on it. 
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Marine Pollution From Nuclear Submarine Accidents 
The Canadian government has not adequately identified the threat posed to the Canadian Arctic 
from possible nuclear submarine accidents in Canadian Arctic waters and thus can not even begin 
to find a solution to this problem. The Canadian government has examined different options with 
which to patrol its Arctic waters, but has not found an agreeable arrangement. At least if the 
threat were identified there could be a serious attempt made to address the issue, whether it 
means patrolling Canadian Arctic waters with our own submarines, suggesting proposals to 
reduce the number of nuclear powered submarines that Russia and the US have or spending 
money to help decommission more of the aging Russian Northern Fleet. The main problem is that 
the Canadian government has not properly identified this threat and thus has not addressed it. 
Marine Pollution From POPs 
With respect to the global threat ofPOPs, the Canadian government has been partially successful 
in identifying and addressing it as a global threat. The Canadian government has used multilateral 
agreements within the United Nations (UN) and AMAP to address the issue ofPOPs. In 1991 
Canada and Sweden led the way in the development of a protocol concerning long-range 
transboundary air pollution in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 267 In 
addition to this Canada co-hosted an international meeting on persistent organic pollutants in 
Vancouver in June of 1995 .268 Canada's enthusiastic participation in these UN negotiations to 
some extent demonstrates that it acknowledges the issue as global in scope. However, the 
problem is that the Canadian government also uses AMAP as an instrument to address POPs. 
The use of AMAP to address POPs means that a great deal of the energy and funds for AMAP 
(which could be spent on nuclear threats) are spent on the POPs issue, when the Canadian 
government and other governments have clearly in other cases addressed it as a global threat. It 
267 DIAND Five Years ... , 40. 
268 Ibid 41 ., . 
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would seem to make more sense to spend more AMAP resources on the nuclear threats, while 
more actively pursuing POPs at global forums such as the UN. 
Atmospheric Pollution From Nuclear Testing 
The Canadian government has not identified or addressed the possible re-commencement of 
nuclear testing in the Arctic as a national security threat. While Russia has signed the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the Canadian government should be acknowledging the 
need to support democratic changes in Russia so that the Russians do not start nuclear testing in 
the Arctic again. Any change in leadership or foreign policy could mean that the CTBT could be 
discarded since it has no enforcement mechanisms. Up to this point the Canadian government 
seems to have ignored this possibility and has not addressed or even identified this threat. 
Atmospheric Pollution From Nuclear Power Plant Accidents 
The Canadian government has been more successful in addressing the threat from aging nuclear 
power plants in Russia because it has singled this area out and adopted a program specifically to 
cope with this issue. When the Canadian government included the CNSI program under the 
sector of security in its technical assistance program, there was a specific recognition of the 
national security threat posed from nuclear power plants in Russia. The result of this recognition 
is that the CNSI had a starting budget of over $30 million and had as its sole purpose making 
" ... Canadian expertise available to the nuclear power industry in Russia and other countries to 
help alleviate the risk of nuclear accidents at Soviet-designed nuclear power stations. "269 The 
attempt to alleviate the risk of nuclear accidents included safety assessments, the operational and 
design upgrading of specific plants and the enhancement of nuclear safety regulations as well as 
scientific training sessions by Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board staff 270 As can be seen 
269 CIDA, 44; Lamb, 81. 
270 Atomic Energy Control Board, "Demand Increasing for Foreign Training," AECB Report 
(Fall 1994): 2. 
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from the comments above the CNSI deals with most of the main problems that exist with the 
aging nuclear power plants in Russia. 
In addition to the CNSI, Canada also contributes funds to the Nuclear Safety Account 
established by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 271 Furthermore, CIDA 
also has two projects that deal with nuclear power plant safety. The first program is designed to 
improve nuclear safety at RBMK plants in Russia. 272 The Canadian government, in cooperation 
with Russian officials, will design specifications for safety modifications, improved operational 
procedures and training in safety design and operations. 273 The other project is designed to 
" ... enhance the capacity of training institutions to provide their own nuclear safety-related training 
program and train the trainers at these training institutions to ensure the sustainability of AECB 
training programs ... "274 As can be seen by these programs the Canadian government is not only 
addressing the issue of poor technology, but also poor training and safety standards. In 
comparison to the other threats the Canadian government has responded to a much greater extent 
to the nuclear power plant threat. Greater action on this issue is probably due to the identification 
of this threat specifically as a security threat. This would not have happened if the Canadian 
government had not witnessed the devastation caused by the Chemobyl accident. Perhaps the 
Canadian government won't take action on the other issues until an accident involving nuclear 
waste or a nuclear submarine causes extensive devastation. 
271 CIDA, 44. 
272 Ibid 46 ., . 
273 Ibid. 
274 Ibid 45 ., . 
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Atmospheric Pollution From Heavy Metals and Acidification 
The problems posed by heavy metals and acidification are complex. For Canada these problems 
should be dealt with at the global level, as they do not pose a national security threat. However, 
for Norway and Finland, the pollution caused by industries on the nearby Kola Peninsula does 
pose a national security threat. The Canadian government has addressed these threats mainly 
though the AEPS. While this regional approach shows concern for this form of environmental 
degradation, the Canadian government should really pursue these issues at the global level where 
more progress can be made. 
CONCLUSION 
While this thesis has argued that there are similarities between environmental and 'traditional' 
security issues there is one large difference. Environmental threats require cooperation from the 
state from which the threat originates. The cooperation on behalf of the source state is crucial to 
a successful solution to the problem. With the end of the Cold War the possibilities for 
cooperation with Russia greatly increased and the Canadian government has performed admirably 
to make sure that the lines of cooperation remain open. Unfortunately it has not performed so 
admirably in the identification of environmental threats. 
The Canadian government has failed to adequately address most environmental threats, largely 
because of its failure to acknowledge them as national security threats. However, the Canadian 
government has also taken a number of measures that demonstrate its concern for the 
environment. This concern, however, does not address the issue that by not distinguishing among 
dire national threats, global threats and environmental concerns serious environmental threats are 
not dealt with properly. The end result is that nearly all of the nuclear threats remain inadequately 
addressed. The exception to this is with the threat posed from the aging nuclear plants in Russia. 
The Canadian government has specifically identified and addressed this threat as a security threat 
and thus it has also given this threat more funding and attention. Thus, the political argument 
made in Chapter One has some merit: by placing this threat on the security agenda, the Canadian 
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government focused more attention and funding on it. While the Canadian government has not 
properly identified and addressed the other nuclear threats, the identification of the nuclear power 
plant threat as a security threat opens the door for other environmental issues to be included 
specifically in the national security agenda. Furthermore, the notion that POPs are global 
security issues is demonstrated by the different approach that the Canadian government, for the 
most part, has taken with respect to POPs. The Canadian government's use of global forums and 
the United Nations supports the suggestion that the best way to address POPs is through global 
initiatives and not national security agendas. Furthermore multilateral programs like AMAP 
would be more useful if they placed most of their energies on more regional threats. 
If governments are to address environmental threats properly they must first identify them 
properly. It is no longer enough to have blanket environmental policies. There are different types 
of environmental threats which require different solutions. Scholars and governments should 
acknowledge that not only do global environmental threats exist, but national environmental 
security threats also exist. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the past governments viewed security issues as purely military threats to a state. In recent 
years the focus on military security has expanded to include other types of threats to security. 
Now policy makers examine issues such as overpopulation, food scarcity, and economic security 
for their security implications. In addition to these issues scholars and policy makers are 
increasingly concerned with the threat posed by environmental degradation. The thesis examined 
the link between the environment and security using the case study of environmental degradation 
in the Russian North. The thesis argued that not only could environmental degradation be seen as 
a security threat, but in specific cases it could be seen as a national security threat. 
Most research on environmental security takes a global perspective. Many scholars suggest 
that environmental threats can only be addressed through global cooperation, as a consequence, 
they downplay the role the nation state. These scholars view national security objectives as being 
in direct contradiction with global security objectives. While there is a need to address global 
environmental threats, there is also a need to address national threats. The nation-state still exists 
and is not likely to disappear in the near future. If states only identify and address global 
environmental threats, they neglect national environmental threats -- each requires different 
responses. 
The case study of the environmental degradation of the Russian North demonstrates that both 
national and global threats exist. The nuclear contamination in the Russian North, for example, 
poses a national security threat to Canada and other nearby states, while Russian and European 
emissions that contribute to the problem of Arctic haze, represent a global security threat. The 
Canadian government needs to address each of these threats, and policy makers need to 
distinguish between global threats that need global solutions and national threats that need 
national or regional solutions. 
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Up to the present time the Canadian government has only properly identified and addressed 
one of the environmental threats from the Russian North-- nuclear power plants. One can 
wonder as to whether or not the Canadian government would even have acknowledged the threat 
from nuclear power plants if it were not for the Chernobyl accident. Canadian policy makers need 
to properly identify other threats such as nuclear waste buildup, nuclear submarine accidents, and 
nuclear testing as national security threats in order to address them effectively. The question 
remains as to whether or not there will have to be another devastating accident from one of the 
other nuclear threats before the Canadian government takes them seriously. 
The results of this study suggest problems for further research. The study of environmental 
degradation in relation to security reveals a need for further investigation of the definition of 
security with the aim of achieving a sharper refinement of this important concept. Further 
research is required, for example, to establish criteria to clearly distinguish between environmental 
threats and environmental concerns. Such refinement is necessary to determine whether issues 
such as overfishing and sealing are environmental threats or environmental concerns. 
A second area for investigation regarding security is the problem surrounding defining national 
and global environmental threats. At the start of this endeavor it was expected that all of the 
instances of environmental degradation examined would prove to be national security threats. 
However, in the process of the analysis it became clear that there were differences between the 
nuclear threats and non-nuclear threats that stemmed both from the sources of these threats as 
well as the number of countries affected by these threats. The result was the realization that a 
distinction had to be made between global and national threats in order for governments to find 
effective strategies for addressing each level of threat. This was not the only unexpected finding . 
Another area for examination that arose from the study was the concept of regional security. 
Throughout the course of the study regional security began to appear as an area that merited 
further investigation. The key question is whether regional security is simply an extension of 
national security or if it requires investigation as an alternative security choice. Is regional 
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security a possible middle ground between national and global security which could address both 
national and global threats? 
Chapter One argued that this thesis was a variation of the most-likely case which if proven true 
could be the basis for further studies. Since the case substantiated the claim that environmental 
degradation can be seen as a national security threat this paves the way for further test cases. In 
the course of this study other possible case studies were brought to light. For example the threat 
posed to Scandinavia from heavy metals and sulfur emissions may prove to be another case that 
substantiates the claims made in this study. In addition to this it would be useful to investigate 
other regions in order to assess whether or not similar cases can be made. A comparative study 
of several different types of environmental degradation in several different regions may be the 
next step towards further research in this area. In addition to this it may be necessary to further 
investigate the links between health effects and pollution in order to better substantiate the threat 
posed by environmental degradation. 
A final area of research that emerged from this study was to look at what tools Canada and 
other countries might use in order to address new threats to security. Whether or not the 
identification of threats makes a real difference in policy requires further investigation. The first 
step in this process is to differentiate between national and global threats as well as concerns and 
threats. After this there are many different policies and tools that the Canadian government could 
use. For example determining whether bilateral or multilateral negotiations are necessary. In the 
case of the nuclear threats to Canada from the Russian North one possible response could be 
similar the CNSI. In other words a specific program could be set up not only to analyze what the 
specific problems associated with the threat are, but also to search for strategies to effectively 
address the threat. The goal of these strategies should always be to lessen the threat that exists to 
the Canadian population. The main observable response that the identification of a national 
security threat gives is in terms of dollars. Since funds are a main issue in addressing most of 
these threats this is not an insignificant immediate response. However, further research could 
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delve into greater detail on what specific policies the Canadian government could pursue with 
respect to the threats outlined in this work as well as others. 
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